Thanks are due to William Dunaway, John Hawthorne, Jeffrey King, Gabriel Rabin, Jason Turner, James Van Cleve, and Ryan Wasserman for comments and conversation.
When Best Theories Go Bad†
Article first published online: 25 FEB 2009
© 2009 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 78, Issue 2, pages 392–405, March 2009
How to Cite
MANLEY, D. (2009), When Best Theories Go Bad. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78: 392–405. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00248.x
- Issue published online: 25 FEB 2009
- Article first published online: 25 FEB 2009
It is common for contemporary metaphysical realists to adopt Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment while at the same time repudiating his ontological pragmatism.2 Drawing heavily from the work of others—especially Joseph Melia and Stephen Yablo—I will argue that the resulting approach to meta-ontology is unstable. In particular, if we are metaphysical realists, we need not accept ontological commitment to whatever is quantified over by our best first-order theories.