Many thanks to Alvin Goldman, Sandy Goldberg, Thomas Grundmann, participants at the 2009 Cologne Summer School on the work of Alvin Goldman, and participants at the November 2010 meeting of the Greater Philadelphia Works in Progress in Epistemology group for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage, the Division of Mental Labor, and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant
Article first published online: 24 OCT 2011
© 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 86, Issue 2, pages 266–294, March 2013
How to Cite
Shieber, J. (2013), Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage, the Division of Mental Labor, and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86: 266–294. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00524.x
- Issue published online: 11 MAR 2013
- Article first published online: 24 OCT 2011
In what follows, I appeal to Charles Babbage’s discussion of the division of mental labor to provide evidence that—at least with respect to the social acquisition, storage, retrieval, and transmission of knowledge—epistemologists have, for a broad range of phenomena of crucial importance to actual knowers in their epistemic practices in everyday life, failed adequately to appreciate the significance of socially distributed cognition. If the discussion here is successful, I will have demonstrated that a particular presumption widely held within the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of testimony—a presumption that I will term the personalist requirement—fails to account for those very practices of knowers that I detail here. I will then conclude by suggesting that an alternate account of testimonial warrant, one that has heretofore been underappreciated, ought to be given more serious consideration—in particular because it is well suited to account for those actual practices of knowers that the personalist requirement leaves unrecognized.