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Truth, Paradox, and Ineffable Propositions†

  1. JAMES R. SHAW

Article first published online: 24 OCT 2011

DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00530.x

Issue

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volume 86, Issue 1, pages 64–104, January 2013

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How to Cite

SHAW, J. R. (2013), Truth, Paradox, and Ineffable Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86: 64–104. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00530.x

Author Information

  1. University of Pittsburgh

  1. †

    In writing this paper, I've benefited from helpful discussions with Sharon Berry, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Koellner, Jon Litland, Bernhard Nickel, an anonymous referee, and from comments from audiences at the Harvard/MIT Eminees Reading Group, the University of Texas at Austin, and the University of Pittsburgh.

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 8 JAN 2013
  2. Article first published online: 24 OCT 2011

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