Thanks to anonymous referees, Justin Capes, Sean Choi, John Fischer, James Gibson, Bill Hasker, Roberto Loss, Jonah Nagashima, Al Plantinga, Mike Rea, Brad Rettler, Patrick Todd, Peter van Inwagen, and audiences at Biola, IUPUI, Northern Illinois, Notre Dame, UC Riverside, UI Urbana-Champagne, and Western Michigan for helpful conversation and comments on ancestors of this paper. Special thanks to Joe Campbell and the van Plantingwagena reading platoon for lively discussion and encouragement.
1933-1592/asset/bannerforeground.gif?v=1&s=8b5bd4cfb54387f9d9758742c88cd829c8d5ae1e)
Incompatibilism and the Past†
Article first published online: 22 MAR 2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00542.x
© 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Additional Information
How to Cite
BAILEY, A. M. (2012), Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85: 351–376. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00542.x
- †
Publication History
- Issue published online: 13 SEP 2012
- Article first published online: 22 MAR 2012
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
Abstract
There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.