The standard picture of Descartes qua arch substance dualist is somewhat belied by his intense interest in what we would now call neurophysiology and his prescient recognition that almost all of what we would now call psychological phenomena—bodily and external sensation, emotion, imagination, and memory—depend on the body and brain (see, e.g., Farkas 2005; Cottingham 1985; T.H. Huxley 1874).
Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition
Article first published online: 22 MAR 2012
© 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 86, Issue 3, pages 590–617, May 2013
How to Cite
Dempsey, L. P. and Shani, I. (2013), Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86: 590–617. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00553.x
- Issue published online: 3 MAY 2013
- Article first published online: 22 MAR 2012
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