I am indebted to James Woodward for correspondence that exerted a decisive impact on this paper. I am also grateful to Ned Block, José Luis Bermúdez, Tyler Burge, Peter Carruthers, Kevin Falvey, Ian Nance, Agustín Rayo, Brad Weslake, and Eric Yang for helpful discussion of these issues. My research was supported by a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment for the Humanities.
The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation
Article first published online: 24 AUG 2012
© 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 88, Issue 1, pages 173–208, January 2014
How to Cite
Rescorla, M. (2014), The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88: 173–208. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00619.x
- Issue published online: 10 JAN 2014
- Article first published online: 24 AUG 2012
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