See for instance: †, ‡, §, ¶, ‖, ††, ‡‡. The terminology ‘state- given’ and ‘object-given’ seems unanimously held to have been introduced by Derek Parfit (see §§).
1933-1592/asset/bannerforeground.gif?v=1&s=8b5bd4cfb54387f9d9758742c88cd829c8d5ae1e)
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object-Given Reasons
Article first published online: 13 SEP 2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x
© 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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BOOTH, A. R. (2012), Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object-Given Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x
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- Article first published online: 13 SEP 2012
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Abstract
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.