See for instance: Danielsson and Olson 2007, Hieronymi 2005, Kolodny 2005, Olson 2004, Reisner 2009, Shah 2006, Way forthcoming. The terminology ‘state- given’ and ‘object-given’ seems unanimously held to have been introduced by Derek Parfit (see Parfit 2001).
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object-Given Reasons
Article first published online: 13 SEP 2012
© 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
How to Cite
BOOTH, A. R. (2012), Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object-Given Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x
- Article first published online: 13 SEP 2012
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.