CLIMATE CHANGE AND COOPERATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SHARING: AN APPLICATION OF STOCHASTIC STACKELBERG DIFFERENTIAL GAMES IN VOLTA RIVER BASIN
Article first published online: 9 AUG 2011
Copyright ©2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Natural Resource Modeling
Volume 24, Issue 4, pages 409–444, November 2011
How to Cite
BHADURI, A., MANNA, U., BARBIER, E. and LIEBE, J. (2011), CLIMATE CHANGE AND COOPERATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SHARING: AN APPLICATION OF STOCHASTIC STACKELBERG DIFFERENTIAL GAMES IN VOLTA RIVER BASIN. Natural Resource Modeling, 24: 409–444. doi: 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2011.00097.x
- Issue published online: 21 OCT 2011
- Article first published online: 9 AUG 2011
- Received by the editors on 12th July 2010. Accepted 21st June 2011.
- climate change;
- Volta River Basin
Abstract As multiple countries share a river, the likelihood of conflicts over distributing water resources increases, particularly under the effects of climate change. In this paper, we demonstrate how countries can cooperate in sustainable transboundary water sharing under such conditions. We examine the case of water distribution in the Volta Basin of West Africa between the upstream country, Burkina Faso, and the downstream country, Ghana. The latter faces an additional tradeoff between the production of hydropower in the south, close to the outlet of the basin, and agricultural water use in the reservoir’s catchment area in the north. In the framework of a stochastic Stackelberg differential game, we show how sustainable water-sharing agreements can be achieved by linking transboundary flows to hydropower exports. Our results indicate that, through cooperation, Ghana will have an opportunity to increase its water abstraction for agriculture, which has remained largely restricted. We also find that the equilibrium strategies for the long-run distribution are stable even with increasing variances of water flow.