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EQUIVALENCIES IN THE FISHERY

Authors

  • JON M. CONRAD,

    Corresponding author
    1. The Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management Cornell University 455 Warren Hall Ithaca, NY 14853 E-mail: jmc16@cornell.edu
      Jon M. Conrad, The Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, 455 Warren Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA, E-mail: jmc16@cornell.edu
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  • BENJAMIN P. LEARD

    1. The Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management Cornell University 316 Warren Hall Ithaca, NY 14853 E-mail: bpl47@cornell.edu
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Jon M. Conrad, The Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, 455 Warren Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA, E-mail: jmc16@cornell.edu

Abstract

Abstract We consider the management of a resource by a sole owner whose utility depends on income and leisure. Income is generated from time spent harvesting the resource and time spent working for a wage in the nonfishing sector. Our analysis produces two results. (i) The sole owner maximizing discounted utility will seek to achieve the same steady-state optimum as a manager seeking to maximize discounted net revenue. (ii) The approach paths to the common steady-state optimum will be the same if the utility function is linear in income and separable in income and leisure. These equivalencies are illustrated in a numerical example.

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