Female and Minority Judicial Nominees: President's Delight and Senators' Dismay?
Version of Record online: 26 OCT 2011
© 2011 The Comparative Legislative Research Center of The University of Iowa
Legislative Studies Quarterly
Volume 36, Issue 4, pages 591–619, November 2011
How to Cite
ASMUSSEN, N. (2011), Female and Minority Judicial Nominees: President's Delight and Senators' Dismay?. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 36: 591–619. doi: 10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00028.x
- Issue online: 26 OCT 2011
- Version of Record online: 26 OCT 2011
Female and minority judicial nominations take longer and are less likely to be confirmed, yet presidents eagerly seek such nominations. I account for this puzzle by building a model in which senators face costs for opposing female and minority nominees. I predict that such nominations are more likely when the gridlock interval is large. Using appellate nominations from 1977 to 2004, I find that Republican presidents are more likely to pursue these nominations during periods of high gridlock. Furthermore, accounting for the gridlock interval erases the differences in confirmation duration and success between female/minority nominees and white male nominees.