Duncan MacIntosh is an assistant professor of philosophy at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. He received his Ph. D.from the University of Toronto in 1986. He is interested in the philosophies of language, science, and mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and meta-ethics, and his recent writings are on the relationship between morality and rationality.
LIBERTARIAN AGENCY AND RATIONAL MORALITY: ACTION-THEORETIC OBJECTIONS TO GAUTHIER'S DISPOSITIONAL SOLUTION OF THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM1
Article first published online: 26 MAR 2010
1988 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 26, Issue 4, pages 499–525, Winter 1988
How to Cite
MacIntosh, D. (1988), LIBERTARIAN AGENCY AND RATIONAL MORALITY: ACTION-THEORETIC OBJECTIONS TO GAUTHIER'S DISPOSITIONAL SOLUTION OF THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 26: 499–525. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1988.tb02162.x
This paper is, in effect, a reply to Richmond Campbell's (1988a), first presented at Dalhousie University in 1986. I am grateful to Campbell for pointing me at the relevant literature, for his searching criticism, and for his editorial comments. My thanks are also due to Neera Badhwar, Robert Bright, Douglas Butler, Robert Martin, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Terrance Tomkow, Kadri Vihvelin, and Sheldon Wein, and to an anonymous referee who requested some important clarifications in the exposition of Gauthier's program. I am especially indebted to Julia Colterjohn, whose role as foil is evident throughout, and who read earlier versions with undaunted incredulity. My thanks to the Killam Trust of Dalhousie University, whose post-doctoral fellowship support I enjoyed during the spring and summer of 1986.
- Issue published online: 26 MAR 2010
- Article first published online: 26 MAR 2010