James Baillie received his Ph.D. from the University of Glasgow in 1989, where he taught before becoming Assistant Professor at the University of Portland in 1990. He is the author of Problems in Personal Identity (New York: Paragon House 1993) and several articles on personal identity and philosophical psychology.
WHAT MATTERS IN SURVIVAL?
Version of Record online: 26 MAR 2010
1993 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 31, Issue 3, pages 255–261, Fall 1993
How to Cite
Baillie, J. (1993), WHAT MATTERS IN SURVIVAL?. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 31: 255–261. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb01720.x
- Issue online: 26 MAR 2010
- Version of Record online: 26 MAR 2010
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Abstract: I examine Derek Parfit's claim that it doesn't matter whether he survives in the future, if someone survives who is psychologically connected to him by “Relation R.” Thus, were his body to perish and be replaced by an exact duplicate, both physically and psychologically identical to him, this would be just as good as “ordinary” survival. Parfit takes the corollary view that replacement of loved ones by exact duplicates is no loss. In contrast, Peter Unger argues that we place nontransferable value in the lives of individual persons. I argue that the question of the preferability of Relation R over identity is unanswerable at present, as such hypothetical situations are too far removed from our experience to allow any reliable responses. I contrast cases involving artifacts, where we can make informed judgments concerning whether a given object's value would be transferred to a duplicate.