John D. Greenwood is Professor of Philosophy at City College and is a faculty member of the Ph.D. Psychology Program in Experimental Cognition at City College and the Ph.D. Philosophy Program at the Graduate School, City University of New York. His recent publications include Relations and Representations (Routledge, 1991), Explanation and Experiment in Social Psychological Science (Springer-Verlag, 1989), and (as editor) The Future of Folk Psychology (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
SPLIT-BRAINS AND SINGULAR PERSONHOOD
Article first published online: 26 MAR 2010
1993 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 31, Issue 3, pages 285–306, Fall 1993
How to Cite
Greenwood, J. D. (1993), SPLIT-BRAINS AND SINGULAR PERSONHOOD. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 31: 285–306. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb01722.x
- Issue published online: 26 MAR 2010
- Article first published online: 26 MAR 2010
In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.