David Slutsky is a Ph.D. student at the University of Connecticut. In addition to working in metaethics and defending anti-realism about moral properties, his interests include normative ethics and metaphysics. In normative ethics, he works on consequentialism and egalitarianism, defending demanding accounts of moral and political obligation. In metaphysics, he works on the nature of historical properties, defending anti-realism about social, psychological, and biological properties that are supposed to supervene on historical properties.
Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties
Version of Record online: 26 MAR 2010
2001 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 39, Issue 4, pages 595–610, Winter 2001
How to Cite
Slutsky, D. (2001), Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39: 595–610. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2001.tb01835.x
- Issue online: 26 MAR 2010
- Version of Record online: 26 MAR 2010
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