Christine McKinnon is Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Trent University, Canada. Her current research focuses on moral and intellectual virtues and vices, and on character possession as a functional good for humans. She is the author of Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices (Broadview Press, 1999) and several articles on character possession, moral and intellectual virtues, hypocrisy, and sincerity.
Agent Reliabilism, Subjective Justification, and Epistemic Credit
Article first published online: 2 MAR 2010
2006 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 44, Issue 3, pages 489–508, Fall 2006
How to Cite
McKinnon, C. (2006), Agent Reliabilism, Subjective Justification, and Epistemic Credit. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 44: 489–508. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00015.x
- Issue published online: 2 MAR 2010
- Article first published online: 2 MAR 2010
- Cited By
In this paper I examine John Greco's agent reliabilism, in particular, his requirement of subjective justification. I argue that his requirement is too weak as it stands to disqualify as knowledge claims some true beliefs arrived at by reliable processes and that it is vulnerable to the “value problem” objection. I develop a more robust account of subjective justification that both avoids the objection that agents require beliefs about their dispositions in order to be subjectively justified and explains why knowledge is more valuable than true belief.