Maura Tumulty is assistant professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. She is interested in the intersection of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.
Davidson's Fear of the Subjective
Version of Record online: 2 MAR 2010
2006 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 44, Issue 3, pages 509–532, Fall 2006
How to Cite
Tumulty, M. (2006), Davidson's Fear of the Subjective. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 44: 509–532. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00016.x
- Issue online: 2 MAR 2010
- Version of Record online: 2 MAR 2010
- Cited By
According to Donald Davidson, any philosophy of mind that appeals to propositional content is doomed to become an account of the mind as a private theater. But Davidson's own work on thought-attribution can be used to make propositional content safe. This paper uses Davidson's negative reaction to Gareth Evans's works on perceptually based demonstrative thought to tease out a way of talking about propositional content that doesn't slide into subjectivism. It also explains why Davidson saw Evans as a mentalist enemy rather than an externalist ally, and suggests that Evans's work could play an important role in furthering Davidson's distinctive externalism.