Douglas Edwards works mainly on topics in philosophy of language and metaphysics, with particular interest in theories of truth. He received his PhD in 2008 from the University of St. Andrews and, at the time of writing, is an IRCHSS Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University College Dublin and an Associate Fellow of the Northern Institute of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.
SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM
Version of Record online: 1 MAR 2011
© 2011 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 49, Issue 1, pages 28–48, March 2011
How to Cite
Edwards, D. (2011), SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49: 28–48. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00043.x
- Issue online: 1 MAR 2011
- Version of Record online: 1 MAR 2011
What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.