Deborah C. Smith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Kent State University. She is interested in various topics in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Her recent publications include “Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright's Antirealist” (Synthese, 2007) and “Warranted Assertibility and the Norms of Assertoric Practice: Why Truth and Warranted Assertibility are not Coincident Norms” (Ratio, 2005).
MIND-INDEPENDENCE AND THE LOGICAL SPACE OF WRIGHT'S REALIST-RELEVANT AXES
Version of Record online: 11 MAY 2011
© 2011 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 49, Issue 2, pages 164–191, June 2011
How to Cite
SMITH, D. C. (2011), MIND-INDEPENDENCE AND THE LOGICAL SPACE OF WRIGHT'S REALIST-RELEVANT AXES. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49: 164–191. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00047.x
- Issue online: 11 MAY 2011
- Version of Record online: 11 MAY 2011
This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist-relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist-relevant axes that remain if evidence-transcendent truth and reference to evidence-transcendent facts are ruled out by Dummettian meaning-theoretic considerations is not sufficient for what I have elsewhere called “modest metaphysical realism.” I conclude that mind-independence marks yet another realist-relevant axis and explore the relationships between the proposed mind-independence axis and the realist-relevant axes identified by Wright.