• Michael Slote is UST Professor of Ethics at the University of Miami. He is the author of several books and many articles on ethics, political philosophy, and moral psychology, including Moral Sentimentalism (Oxford University Press, 2010) and The Impossibility of Perfection: Aristotle, Feminism, and the Complexities of Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2011). He is currently working on the virtue of receptivity and its relation both to empathy and caring and to the larger historical traditions of Western philosophy.


Justin D'Arms says that moral disapproval is more closely tied to anger than to the “empathic chill” effect I emphasized in Moral Sentimentalism, but I argue that anger is in several ways inappropriate or unsatisfactory as a basis for understanding disapproval. I go on to explain briefly why I think we need not share D'Arms's worries about the possibility of nonveridical empathy but then focus on what he says about the reference-fixing theory of moral terminology defended in Moral Sentimentalism. I explain why I think his interpretations of my view—both at the Spindel Conference and subsequently—misunderstand the (Kripkean) character of that view. My reply to Lori Watson questions whether her criticisms of Moral Sentimentalism's account of morality are sufficiently sensitive to the self−other asymmetry that typifies so much of ordinary moral thinking.