• Jeanette Kennett is Professor of Moral Psychology in the Philosophy Department at Macquarie University. She is the author of Agency and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2001) and has published articles on diverse topics in moral psychology in Ethics, Mind, Journal of Philosophy, and The Philosophical Quarterly. She is co-editor of a forthcoming collection, Fashion: Thinking with Style, in the Wiley-Blackwell series Philosophy for Everyone.


In this article, I explore the implications of Karsten Stueber's account of imaginative resistance, particularly as it relates to the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding described by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues. I suggest that Stueber's account allows us to redescribe the phenomenon as a failure of the folk psychological project of interpretation and so to challenge Haidt's metaethical conclusions. I close by considering some implications for moral deliberation and judgment in those, such as autistic people, whose interpretive capacities are impaired.