• Jesse Prinz is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. He is author of Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perception Basis (MIT Press, 2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford University Press, 2004), and The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford University Press, 2008). He also has two forthcoming books: The Conscious Brain (Oxford University Press) and Beyond Human Nature (Penguin/Norton).


Empathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. In fact, empathy is prone to biases that render it potentially harmful. Another construct—concern—fares somewhat better, but it is also of limited use. I argue that, instead of empathy, moral judgments involve emotions such as anger, disgust, guilt, and admiration. These, not empathy, provide the sentimental foundation for morality.