Jonathan L. Kvanvig is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, having held previous positions at the University of Notre Dame, Texas A&M University, and the University of Missouri. He works primarily in epistemology and philosophy of religion. Recent work includes The Knowability Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2006) and The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
COHERENTISM AND JUSTIFIED INCONSISTENT BELIEFS: A SOLUTION
Article first published online: 1 MAR 2012
© 2012 The University of Memphis
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 50, Issue 1, pages 21–41, March 2012
How to Cite
KVANVIG, J. L. (2012), COHERENTISM AND JUSTIFIED INCONSISTENT BELIEFS: A SOLUTION. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50: 21–41. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00090.x
- Issue published online: 1 MAR 2012
- Article first published online: 1 MAR 2012
The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.