2.5-year-olds succeed at a verbal anticipatory-looking false-belief task
Article first published online: 17 NOV 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02070.x
© 2011 The British Psychological Society
Issue

British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Special Issue: Implicit and explicit theory of mind Guest edited by Jason Low and Josef Perner
Volume 30, Issue 1, pages 14–29, March 2012
Additional Information
How to Cite
He, Z., Bolz, M. and Baillargeon, R. (2012), 2.5-year-olds succeed at a verbal anticipatory-looking false-belief task. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30: 14–29. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02070.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 16 MAR 2012
- Article first published online: 17 NOV 2011
- Received 26 May 2011; revised version received 7 October 2011
- Abstract
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Recent research suggests that infants and toddlers succeed at a wide range of non-elicited-response false-belief tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require children to answer a direct question about a mistaken agent's likely behaviour). However, one exception to this generalization comes from verbal anticipatory-looking tasks, which have produced inconsistent findings with toddlers. One possible explanation for these findings is that toddlers succeed when they correctly interpret the prompt as a self-addressed utterance (making the task a non-elicited-response task), but fail when they mistakenly interpret the prompt as a direct question (making the task an elicited-response task). Here, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in a verbal anticipatory-looking task that was designed to help them interpret the anticipatory prompt as a self-addressed utterance: the experimenter looked at the ceiling, chin in hand, during and after the prompt. Children gave evidence of false-belief understanding in this task, but failed when the experimenter looked at the child during and after the prompt. These results reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief reasoning and provide additional support for the distinction between non-elicited- and elicited-response false-belief tasks. Three accounts of the discrepant results obtained with these tasks – and of early false-belief understanding more generally – are discussed.

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