This article is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at Leiden University. This article benefited from comments from Koen Caminada, Douglas Cumming, Ted Eisenberg, Ronan Powell, Jo-Ann Suchard, Wim Voermans, and three anonymous reviewers.
Strong Financial Laws Without Strong Enforcement: Is Good Law Always Better than No Law?
Article first published online: 18 APR 2013
© 2013, Copyright the Author. Journal compilation © 2013, Cornell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, Inc
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume 10, Issue 2, pages 288–324, June 2013
How to Cite
Humphery-Jenner, M. (2013), Strong Financial Laws Without Strong Enforcement: Is Good Law Always Better than No Law?. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 10: 288–324. doi: 10.1111/jels.12011
- Issue published online: 18 APR 2013
- Article first published online: 18 APR 2013
This article examines whether strong laws are effective when regulatory institutions are weak. This has become especially relevant due to criticisms of financial market regulation in the United States. I test the impact of imposing strong laws on a weak regulatory environment by using China's principled reforms to market manipulation law as a natural experiment. The results from difference-in-difference tests suggest that China's principled law reforms did not improve the market's information environment, as proxied by the level of informed trade and information asymmetry. This implies that principled law reform is ineffective if the regulatory environment is weak.