The Zoning Game: Municipal Practices and Policies 17 (1966). ,
See, e.g., Suburban Nation: The Rise of the Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream (2001) (highlighting Euclidean zoning's typical ban on mixed-use development and promotion of low-density housing); , & , Zoning's Steep Price, 25 Regulation 24 (2002) (finding evidence suggesting that land-use restrictions are responsible for high housing costs in New York City and California); & , Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. Am. Plan. Ass'n 2 (2000) (arguing that low-density zoning tends to exclude the poor and racial minorities from many suburban jurisdictions). ,
Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 Urb. Law. 1, 2 (1992). & ,
Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined? (Harv. Kennedy School, Working Paper No. RWP12-028, 2013), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2081216##>; & , Op-Ed, That Hissing Sound, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/08/opinion/08krugman.html>; , The Public Health Roots of Zoning: In Search of Active Living's Legal Genealogy, 28 Am. J. Preventive Med. 2, 96–104 (2005). & , See also The Gated City (Kindle Single, 2011). ,
E.g., Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (1987). & ,
Id. at 155.
The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government, Taxation, School Finance and Land-Use Politics 18 (2001). ,
See, e.g., 1, at 6–11. , supra
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-07.pdf>. & , Housing Characteristics: 2010, in 2010 Census Briefs (U.S. Census Bureau No. C2010BR-07), available at <
See, e.g., New York for Sale: Community Planning Confronts Global Real Estate (2008); , The Future of Us All: Race and Neighborhood Politics in New York City 98 (1998); , Density and Intervention: New York's Planning Traditions, in The Landscape of Modernity: New York City, 1900–1940 46 (David Ward & Oliver Zunz eds., 1997). ,
By “zoning officials,” we mean all public officials, whether elected or appointed, who formally participate in a jurisdiction's land-use regulation decision making, or direct those who do. Because of wide variation in local government structure, the specific officials involved vary widely between jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Urban Development: The Logic of Making Plans (2001); , Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis 218, 219–21 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978); , Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, Ind. L.J., 53, 145 (1977). ,
See, e.g., Economic Elements in Municipal Zoning Decisions, 39 Land Econ. 4 (1963); , On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas, 75 J. Urb. Econ. 29 (2013); & , Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 45, 64–78 (1994). ,
See, e.g., Arther Seldon & Gordon L. Brady, Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice (2002). ,
See generally, 7, at 72–97; , supra Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 405–07 (1977); , 13. , supra
15, at 407–410. , supra
See, e.g., 1; , supra 7; , supra 15; , supra The Theory and Estimation of Endogenous Zoning, 24 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 601 (1994). & , See also Home Voters, House Prices, and the Political Economy of Zoning (Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts—Session: Political Economy I, No. D10-V1), available at <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62069>; , On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Homeownership Versus Affordability (Nov. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (available at author's website: <http://francois.marginalq.com/documents/OMP_polecon_latest.pdf>). & ,
7. , supra
Id. For critical perspectives on both the descriptive and normative aspects of Fischel's work, particularly the implications for local government service provision to the poor and minorities, see Consuming Government, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1824 (2003) (book review); , Homes Rule, 112 Yale L.J. 617 (2002) (book review). ,
7, at 15–16. , supra
E.g., 7, at 90–92; , supra 15, at 405–406. Indeed, Fischel not only emphasizes the suitability of his theory for smaller suburban jurisdictions, but dismisses the importance of big cities in an increasingly suburban nation. , supra Id. at 92–93. But see The Decline of the Political Consensus for Urban Growth: Evidence from Los Angeles, 22 J. Urb. Aff. 85 (2000) (arguing that homeowner-led anti-growth sentiment has become increasingly important to determining land-use regulation in Los Angeles); , Requiem for a Growth Machine: Homeowner Preeminence in 1980s Los Angeles, 11 J. Plan. Hist. 124 (2012). ,
7, at 92–94. , supra See also Electoral Representation, Zoning Politics, and the Exclusion of Group Homes, 47 Pol. Res. Q. 969 at 973 (1994). ,
15, at 406. , supra
7, at 8–12; , supra An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41 Urb. Stud. 317, 335 (2004). ,
See 7, at 230; , supra 15, at 400; , Suburban Growth Controls, supra Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. Urb. Econ. 116 (1978); , An Examination of the Monopoly Zoning Hypothesis, 72 Land Econ. 1, 43–55 (1996). ,
7, at 39–52. , supra
Id. at 65–67; 2 (2000); , supra 17. & , Theory and Estimation of Endogenous Zoning, supra
7, at 65–69. But see , supra Land Capitalization, Tiebout Mobility, and the Role of Zoning Regulations, 34 J. Urb. Econ. 102 (1993) (arguing that minimum lot sizes, while helpful, are not crucial for income sorting across jurisdictions to occur). ,
The Effects of Fiscal and Exclusionary Zoning on Household Location: A Critical Review, 2 J. Housing Res. 245 (1991). Where officials' reluctance to allow the poor to live in the jurisdiction is driven by fiscal concerns, the fiscal zoning theories described above would apply. ,
For example, residents may resist the entry of poor or nonwhite neighbors because of the perceived threat to public school quality, even if the new entrants are fiscally neutral. For a fuller description of such “public goods zoning” and the practical difficulty in distinguishing it from fiscal zoning, see 19, at 1845–1846; , supra see also What Big Teeth You Have!”: Identifying the Motivation for Exclusionary Zoning, 30 Urb. Stud. 1669 (1993). , “
Of course, zoning decisions motivated specifically by the desire to keep out residents of a particular race or ethnicity violate federal law, but proving intentional discrimination is difficult. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
See, e.g., 5; & , supra 15, at 407; , supra The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 Am. J. Soc. 309 (1977). ,
15, at 408; but see , supra 21 and , supra 21 (arguing that recent history reveals a greatly weakened growth machine in Los Angeles in the face of growing, homeowner-led anti-growth sentiment). , supra
32; , supra The Political Economy of Growth Machines, J. Urb. Aff. 29–53 (1993); , see also 5. & , supra
5, at 29–31, 66. & , supra
Id. at 157.
Id. at 120–121.
Although not directly relevant to our investigation, there is an additional body of research that tests these theories outside the land-use context. See, e.g., A Direct Test of the Homevoter Hypothesis, 64 J. Urb. Econ. 155 (2008) (finding that residential neighborhoods in Arlington, Texas that enjoy the greatest property value benefits of a new football stadium voted for it in higher numbers); , & , Community Power and Population Increase: An Empirical Test of the Growth Machine Model, 86 Am. J. Soc. 1387 (1981) (finding a correlation between the power of a metropolitan area's local business community and its population growth). et al.,
Determinants of Restrictive Suburban Zoning: An Empirical Analysis, 21 J. Urb. Econ. 1 (1987). ,
17. The authors seek to address the problem of endogeneity—particular types of residents may be attracted to communities with certain types of zoning schemes, thus confounding the causal relationship between jurisdiction demographics and zoning characteristics. & , supra
Quasi-Judicial Decision Making and Exclusionary Zoning, 31 Urb. Aff. Rev. 544 (1996). , See also 22 (finding no association between homeownership rate, percent white, or income on the probability that a jurisdiction's zoning excludes group homes). , supra
But see Do House Values Influence Resistance to Development?—A Spatial Analysis of Planning Objection and Appeals in Melbourne, 31 Urb. Pol. & Res. 5 (2013) (finding that high housing values are associated with high rates of formal objections to development proposals in jurisdictions in Melbourne, Australia). ,
In addition to the studies discussed above, see The Determinants of Restrictive Residential Zoning: Some Empirical Findings, 34 J. Regional Sci. 253–263 (1994) (finding evidence of externality, fiscal, and poverty-based exclusion motivations in Connecticut jurisdictions in the 1960s); & , Testing for Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: The Case of Growth Controls, 44 J. Urb. Econ. 438 (1998) (finding that that growth controls are more likely in California jurisdictions with high home values, low densities, and that are near other communities that recently enacted controls, though income has no effect); , Determinants of Suburban Growth Controls: A Fischel Expedition, 41 Urb. Stud. 341 (2004) (finding that the relationship between growth controls in Chicago suburbs and several geographic and demographic characteristics are consistent with Fischel's hypothesis); & , Do House Values Influence Resistance to Development?—A Spatial Analysis of Planning Objection and Appeals in Melbourne, 31 Urb. Pol. & Res. 5 (2013) (finding that high housing values are associated with high rates of formal objections to development proposals). ,
Local Variations in Land Use Regulations, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urb. Aff. 221 (2003); & , The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. Urb. Econ. 265 (2009). & ,
Modeling Local Growth Control Decisions in a Multi-City Case: Do Spatial Interactions and Lobbying Efforts Matter? 154 Pub. Choice 95 (2013). et al.,
Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 Yale L.J. 483 (1973). et al.,
Id. at 500.
, supra 13. & See also The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply, 125 Q.J. Econ. 1253 (2010) (using data similar to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud and finding that higher housing prices, population growth, and geographical constraints on buildable land area lead to more restrictive metro-level land-use regulation). ,
Furthermore, in highly urbanized areas without significant suburban fringe, the practical difference between the two groups in Hilbert and Robert-Nicoud's framework (or at least their urban analogs) is somewhat blurred. In the absence of developable greenfields, land occupied by relatively small or old structures may function simultaneously as existing development and as effectively vacant, developable land that can be redeveloped at a higher density.
Politics, Administration, and Local Land-Use Regulation: Analyzing Zoning as a Policy Process, 49 Pub. Admin. Rev. 337 (1989); , see also Citizens, Development Interests, and Local Land Use Regulations, 52 J. Pol. 838 (1990) (finding that neither citizen opposition nor developer presence were accurate predictors of a rezoning application's probability of approval). But see & , Participation and Rules—The Functions of Zoning, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 709 (finding that citizen opposition and support to rezoning proposals in Evanston, Illinois were correlated with their outcomes). ,
The Influence of Race on Rezoning Decisions: Equality of Treatment in Black and White Census Tracts, 1955–1980, 14 Rev. Black Pol. Econ. 51 (1986). & ,
See also A Markov Chain Model of Zoning Change, 30 J. Urb. Econ. 257 (1991) (uses regression analysis to identify the determinants of zoning changes for 260 10-acre tracts in suburban Chicago between 1961 and 1981). Controlling for land prices, the authors estimate the effects of several geographical variables, including proximity to rail lines, highways, and key local and regional destinations, on a tract's likelihood of having changed zoning characteristics. Although they conclude from their results that the land-use patterns that emerge from the zoning changes are likely driven by externality concerns, the authors do not otherwise weigh in on the political economy of zoning decisions, and do not even include demographic variables in their analysis. & ,
Dynamics of the Urban Zoning Structure: An Empirical Investigation of Zoning Change, 58 J. Urb. Econ. 455 (2005). ,
The Political Economy of Downzoning, 38 Agricultural & Resource Econ. Rev. 181 (2009). & ,
See, e.g., 46; , supra 4; & , supra 2; , supra The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44 Urb. Aff. Rev. 779 (2009); & , Housing Costs, Zoning, and Access to High Scoring Schools (Brookings, Apr. 2012), available at <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/4/19%20school%20inequality%20rothwell/0419_school_inequality_rothwell>. ,
See, e.g., 2; & , supra No Renters in My Suburban Backyard: Land Use Regulation and Rental Housing, 28 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 296 (2009); , 25; , supra The Impact of Minimum Lot Size Regulations on House Prices in Eastern Massachusetts, 41 Regional Reg'l Sci. & Urb. Econ. 571 (2011). But see & , The Effects of Land Use Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn? 8 Cityscape 69 (2005) (identifying limitations to prior research relating land-use regulation to regional housing prices). & ,
See, e.g., 4; , supra Job Creation and Housing Construction: Constraints on Metropolitan Area Employment Growth, 64 J. Urb. Econ. 178 (2008). ,
See, e.g., 5; & , supra From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 Minn, L. Rev. 739 (1993); , Let L.A. Be L.A., 33 City J. 3 (2012). ,
For a discussion of the evolving standards of review, see 3; & , supra see also The Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use Law: A Substitute for Analysis, a Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 301 (1996) (arguing that the concept of presumptions be jettisoned altogether rather than reformed). ,
See The Significance of Reliance in Land Use Law, BYU L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2237644##>. ,
Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 588 (Or. 1973).
Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs supra 63, at 73.
Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. 1993).
South Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 157 (N.J. 1975).
See, e.g., Direct Democracy and Land Use Policy: Exchanging Public Goods for Development Rights, 41 Urb. Stud. 463 (2004); & , The Manoa Valley Special District Ordinance: Community-Based Planning in the Post-Lucas Era, 19 Haw. L. Rev. 449 (1997). ,
For a review of state legislation addressing exclusionary zoning, see Land Use Controls, Cases and Materials 779–84 (4th ed. 2013). et al.,
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B (2013).
See, e.g., 15, at 494–509. , supra
Balancing the Zoning Budget, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 81 (2011). Hills and Schleicher propose a system in which city government must periodically set a binding development target with which subsequent rezoning actions would cumulatively have to comply. By agreeing ex ante on city-wide goals, public officials would thereby staunch the ratcheting down of development capacity in much of New York City that has resulted from piecemeal, unlinked zoning actions supported by what are in essence pockets of homevoters. & ,
For a timeline of the rezoning actions, see Timeline on Neighborhoods Count: Celebrating DCP Rezonings, NYC.gov <http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/rezonings/rezonings3.shtml (last visited Aug. 2, 2012).
Our data are described in Section III.B. We focus on the rezonings completed through 2009; as of fall of 2013, there have been about 22 more.
All these rezonings were proposed and championed by the city's DCP. Throughout this period, other parties, namely, private landowners and civic associations, also applied for zoning map changes, but these generally affected individual lots or small groups of lots in anticipation of specific projects. We do not include these zoning changes in our analysis because, unlike the zoning changes in our sample, the role of public officials was limited to approval or denial.
43 Rules of the City of N.Y. § 6-01.
62 Rules of the City of N.Y. §§ 5-03, 5-05.
Id., § 2-02(a)(5).
N.Y.C. Charter § 197-c. At least half of all members of a community board must be nominees of city council members representing part of the community district. Id., § 2800.a.
Id., § 197-c.e.
Id., § 197-c.g.
Id., § 192.
Id., § 197-c.h.
Id., § 197-d.
E.g., the Jan. 19, 2005 adoption of the “Hudson Yards” zoning map changes (N.Y.C. Land Use Application 20040499(A)ZMM).
The mayor does have the right to veto a rezoning decision, but the veto can be overridden by a vote of two-thirds of the City Council. Id.
See, e.g., New York City Department of City Planning, “Kew Gardens and Richmond Hill Overview,” at: <http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/kewgardens/index.shtml (last accessed on June 23, 2009); and New York City Department of City Planning, “Bensonhurst Overview,” at: <http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bensonhurst/index.shtml (last accessed on June 23, 2009).
The city also has expressed its broad, city-wide planning goals in PlaNYC 2030, its long-term sustainable development plan, as well as in the DCP's strategic plan. PlaNYC 2030, produced by the city's Office of Long Term Planning and Sustainability, lays out an agenda for the city's land-use and housing development, air and water quality, transportation infrastructure, energy use and production, and preparedness for climate change. PlaNYC 2030 sets a goal of adding 265,000–500,000 units to the city's housing supply by 2030, particularly in areas well served by public transit. City of New York, PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater, New York (2007). DCP's strategic plan articulates the city's more immediate planning goals, including strengthening regional business districts, facilitating housing production (again focused near transit), and fostering mixed-use developments, while also protecting “neighborhood character.” New York City Department of City Planning, Shaping the City: A Strategic Blueprint for New York City's Future (2009), available at: <http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/about/strategy.shtml>.
Underused Lots in New York City (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy Working Paper, 2009), available at <https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1682_Underused-Lots-in-New-York-City>. , , & ,
Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy, State of New York City's Housing and Neighborhoods 2009, at 13 (2010).
Perspectives: High-Rise Housing; The Stakes in “Contextual Zoning”, NY Times, Mar. 2, 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/02/realestate/perspectives-high-rise-housing-the-stakes-in-contextual-zoning.html?pagewanted=all>. ,
See, e.g., New York City Department of City Planning, “Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Queens Borough President Helen Marshall Announce the Rezoning of Queens Neighborhoods to Help Curb Over-Development,” Press Release # 150-04 (2004).
Up-Zoning New York City's Mixed-Use Neighborhoods: Property-Led Economic Development and the Anatomy of a Planning Dilemma, 24 J. Plan. Educ. & Res. 379 (2005). ,
Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy, State of New York City's Housing and Neighborhoods 2010, at 38 (2011).
As described further in Section III.B.1., “FAR” refers to “floor area ratio,” the primary regulatory constraint on building bulk in New York City's zoning code.
We note that “upzone” and “downzone” are used inconsistently in the literature. We use the terms to describe the change in allowable density on a parcel (e.g., after an upzoning, a parcel can be developed with more density). Sometimes, people use “up” or “down” to refer to the strictness of regulations, which effectively gives them the opposite meanings.
As described in Section II.D., all the rezoning projects formally entered into ULURP by the DCP were approved, though not every lot inside a subject area was actually rezoned. We have no data about potential rezoning projects that the DCP studied internally but declined to enter into the formal land-use process so are unable to incorporate those lots into our model.
We recognize that comparing the outcomes of only those lots considered for rezoning, rather than the outcomes of all lots (regardless of whether considered for rezoning) runs the risk that the relationships we find are endogenous to the choice of the areas studied for rezonings. But comparing the rezoned lots to all other lots would run the risk that we were ignoring substantial differences between those areas studied for rezoning and those areas that were never seriously considered for change.
As described in Section II.B.1, our method for determining the rezoning outcome for each lot does not specify the year that the study area's rezoning was enacted. For this reason we cannot control for changes in the rezoning strategy over time. Because the rezonings were all done by the same administration, however, we do not expect that there would be considerable differences in strategy over the seven-year study period.
For example, lots with zero residential development capacity cannot be downzoned and lots in the highest density zoning districts cannot be upzoned.
This modeling structure is a product of experimentation with several different iterations, including simple simultaneous binary logits and more parsimonious models that focused on each individual rezoning outcome.
We create the core of the database by matching the 2003 version of the New York City Department of Finance's Real Property Assessment Data (RPAD) (which includes basic information about every parcel of land in New York City, including the zoning district in which it is located) to the 2003 version of LotInfo, a privately produced data set that geocodes each lot to shape files on a basemap. We use GIS to identify which lots are located inside a rezoning study area defined by DCP. We then match each 2003 lot to the 2009 version of RPAD to create a panel for tracking zoning district changes. For lots that change identification numbers, are combined with other lots, or are split into multiple lots between 2003 and 2009, we use a spatial matching process in GIS that overlays the 2003 LotInfo basemap onto the basemap released by the city with the 2009 version of its Primary Land Use Tax Output (PLUTO) data set. This allows us to associate these 2003 lots with the corresponding, altered, 2009 lots in RPAD. If we are unable to match a 2003 lot to any lot in 2009 RPAD data, we omit it from our sample. Less than 3 percent of the raw LotInfo data set with geographic data was dropped for this reason, so our sample is extremely comprehensive.
We estimate each lot's 2003 and 2009 zoned residential capacity (measured in square feet of building area) based on an analysis of New York City's zoning code, the lot's land area, and certain other relevant lot characteristics. This process is an expansion of the method we used to estimate zoned capacity in 90. By looking at the applicable zoning district in 2003 and 2009 and at any change in zoned capacity over this period, we then determine whether the lot was rezoned in the interim and calculate the effect, if any, of the rezoning on zoned residential capacity. Further information about our method for estimating zoned capacity is available upon request. The 10 percent threshold for our outcome definitions is based on our qualitative analysis of different types of zoning changes. Due to non-FAR constraints, a vast majority of lots whose maximum FAR was changed by less than 10 percent experienced no material change in allowable unit density and were located in low-density zoning districts, where small changes in building bulk would be barely perceptible. More than 90 percent of all upzoned and downzoned lots had their maximum FAR change by more than 15 percent. et al., supra
Floor area ratio, or FAR, is the ratio of the building area on a lot to the land area of a lot. A maximum allowable FAR sets a cap on the amount of building area that can be developed on a single lot but does not itself specify how it can be arranged on the lot.
To generate our transit and park proximity variables we use GIS network analysis of the LotInfo base map and station location information from the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) for New York City Transit subway lines, the Staten Island Railway, the Metro-North Railroad, and the Long Island Railroad. Congestion information is provided by the MTA for segments of each rail line.
Walking distances and park size are generated using GIS analysis of the LotInfo base map.
New York City's Department of Education organizes the city's public schools into 32 school districts. District-level capacity data and standardized test performance data are from the New York City Department of Education and are for 2003 and 2005, respectively.
The price change data for each community district are from a repeat-sales-based price index for residential properties calculated by the Furman Center. For more information about the price index, see Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy, State of New York City's Housing and Neighborhoods 2011, at 149 (2012).
We exclude from our calculation of high population growth all Census tracts with a 1990 population less than 200.
Our building permit data are from the New York City Department of Buildings. To calculate the number of nearby permits, we count all new construction permits filed on a lot's block between 1998 and 2003 and (using GIS) on all other blocks that intersect a 1,000-foot buffer around that block.
We recognize that some of our demographic variables are moderately (or even highly) correlated, but given our large sample size (New York City has more than 2,000 Census tracts), we do not believe multicollinearity is a significant issue for our model. Simplified models with less-correlated variables yielded similar results.
We match lots to election districts using an election district shape file from the New York City Board of Elections. We use LotInfo to calculate the number of units located within each district. For lots located inside more than one district, we spatially weight the lot to allocate its units between districts.
To construct this variable we use the building age, building type, and land area fields from RPAD.
We use GIS analysis of the LotInfo basemap to measure the widths of rights of way. Consistent with provisions in New York City's zoning code, we classify as narrow any right of way less than 75 feet wide.
Data used to construct this variable are from RPAD, except for street width, which is from GIS analysis of the LotInfo basemap.
RPAD identifies lots that are vacant land.
Lots that permit no residential development have a residential FAR in our data set of zero. Counts of jobs in Census blocks are from the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Employment and Household Dynamics data. Our cutoff between high- or low-employment Census blocks is 95 employees.
Data on housing unit construction and renovation financed with city funds was provided by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development.
Data are derived from a review of historical committee membership records and matching lots to council districts using the 2003 and 2004 version of PLUTO (between which dates council districts were redrawn).
Campaign finance data are from the New York City Campaign Finance Board.
We do not show the odds ratios for the relative probability that a lot was subject to a non-FAR rezoning.
It is possible that those with exclusionary motives would support a radical upzoning of neighborhoods with substantial minority or ethnic population in order to facilitate a complete “urban renewal” project. See Dubin, supra 59. We cannot distinguish between rezonings of different magnitudes.
The difficulty of extracting testable hypotheses from the growth machine and homevoter theories also suggests that better theories may emerge if scholars provide not only general political theories but also more detailed predictions about how decisionmakers will actually behave if those theories are correct.
See 71. & , supra
E.g., the “anti-snob zoning” act in Massachusetts (described supra 69) or the state-level review in Oregon of regional plans that must take into account the need for new housing at affordable prices ( et al., supra 68).
In addition to home equity insurance, like that described by Fischel (7, at 268–270), Lee Ann Fennell suggests allowing capital losses from home sales to be more generously carried over to offset other gains. , supra 19, at 657. , supra