We are grateful to Hongbin Cai, Jacques Cremer, Martin Cripps, Jeoren Hinloopen, Eugen Kovac, Daniel Krähmer, Matthias Kräkel, Konrad Mierendorff, Piergiovanna Natale, Patrick Rey, Urs Schweizer, and participants at seminars at the Peking University, University of Bonn, University of Amsterdam, and Cresse conference in Crete for discussions on the topic.
Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives
Version of Record online: 10 JUL 2013
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volume 22, Issue 3, pages 488–512, Fall 2013
How to Cite
Etro, F. and Cella, M. (2013), Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 22: 488–512. doi: 10.1111/jems.12021
- Issue online: 10 JUL 2013
- Version of Record online: 10 JUL 2013
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