Accepted by Philip Berger. We would like to thank an anonymous referee, Dave Denis, Diane Denis, Alex Edmans, Mara Faccio, Stu Gillan, Marc Goergen, Eitan Goldman, Jay Hartzell, Hayne Leland, John McConnell, Christine Parlour, Joshua Rauh, Vivek Sharma, Richard Stanton, Peter Swan, Hongfei Tang, David Yermack, and seminar participants at the University of California at Berkeley, the 2010 Conference on Managerial Compensation at Cardiff University, the Third Singapore International Conference on Finance, the Midwest Finance Association, 2009, the Financial Management Association, 2010, and the American Finance Association, 2012 for helpful comments. We would also like to thank Micah Allred, Clarke Bjarnason, Rahsan Bozkurt, Francis Instein, Amanda Thompson, and Jing Wang for able research assistance.
How Do Ex Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?
Article first published online: 16 JAN 2013
Copyright ©, University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2013
Journal of Accounting Research
Volume 51, Issue 3, pages 631–671, June 2013
How to Cite
RAU, P. R. and XU, J. (2013), How Do Ex Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?. Journal of Accounting Research, 51: 631–671. doi: 10.1111/joar.12001
- Issue published online: 11 APR 2013
- Article first published online: 16 JAN 2013
- Received 2 May 2011; accepted 26 November 2012
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