Rewarding Trading Skills without Inducing Gambling

Authors

  • IGOR MAKAROV,

  • GUILLAUME PLANTIN

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    • Makarov is with the London School of Economics and Plantin is with the Toulouse School of Economics. We are most grateful for helpful comments made by the Editor (Cam Harvey) and two anonymous referees, as well as Gilles Chemla, Zhiguo He, Christopher Hennessy, Roni Kisin, Peter Kondor, Semyon Malamud, Gustavo Manso, Andrea Prat, Jan Schneider, Lars Stole, Ilya Strebulaev, and seminar participants at Chicago Booth, Imperial College, Kellogg, LBS, Pompeu Fabra, Rochester, Queen Mary, University of London, University of Lugano, University of Tokyo, Vienna University, American Finance Association 2011 Denver meetings, HKUST Finance Symposium, Second Paris Hedge Fund Conference, Third Annual Paul Woolley Centre Conference, Society for Economic Dynamics 2010 Montreal Meeting, Second Theory Workshop on Corporate Finance and Financial Markets, New York, and UBC Summer Conference 2010. Plantin benefitted from a European Research Council Starting Grant (No. 263673 – RIFIFI).


ABSTRACT

This paper develops a model of active asset management in which fund managers may forgo alpha-generating strategies, preferring instead to make negative-alpha trades that enable them to temporarily manipulate investors' perceptions of their skills. We show that such trades are optimally generated by taking on hidden tail risk, and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient and when their trading skills are scalable, and generate a high profit per unit of risk. We propose long-term contracts that deter this behavior by dynamically adjusting the dates on which the manager is compensated in response to her cumulative performance.

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