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CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

Authors

  • DIRK JENTER,

  • FADI KANAAN

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    • Dirk Jenter is at Stanford University and the National Bureau of Economic Research. Fadi Kanaan is at Liberty Mutual Insurance. We thank an anonymous referee, Nittai Bergman, Andrew Bernard, François Degeorge, Xavier Gabaix, Diego Garcia, Robert Gibbons, Jeffrey Gordon, Yaniv Grinstein, Jarrad Harford, Li Jin, Rafael LaPorta, Jonathan Lewellen, Katharina Lewellen, Kalina Manova, David McAdams, Todd Milbourn, Holger Mueller, Thomas Philippon, Joshua Pollet, Antoinette Schoar, Jeremy Stein, Karin Thorburn, Joel Vanden, Eric Van den Steen, Ivo Welch, Kent Womack, and seminar participants at MIT Sloan, the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Dartmouth Tuck, Stanford GSB, Berkeley Haas, the University of Frankfurt, the 2006 Washington University Corporate Finance Conference, the 2006 Western Finance Association Meeting, the 2006 Caesarea Center Finance Conference, and the 2006 NBER Corporate Governance Summer Institute for their comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.


ABSTRACT

This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand-collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90th to the 10th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.

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