Ties That Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism

Authors

  • DRAGANA CVIJANOVIĆ,

  • AMIL DASGUPTA,

  • KONSTANTINOS E. ZACHARIADIS

    Search for more papers by this author
    • Cvijanović is at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Dasgupta is at the London School of Economics and affiliated with the CEPR and ECGI. Zachariadis is at the London School of Economics. We are grateful to the Editor, Kenneth Singleton, and two anonymous referees for insightful input. We thank Miloš Božović, Vicente Cuñat, Daniel Ferreira, Nick Gantchev, Christian Julliard, Dong Lou, Gregor Matvos, Adair Morse, Abhiroop Mukherjee, Daniel Paravisini, Michael Roberts, Breno Schmidt, Geoff Tate, Moqi Xu, Jonathan Zinman, and audiences at the Belgrade Young Economists Conference, LSE, NBER Summer Institute 2014 Law and Economics Workshop, NC State, University of Lugano, and Western Finance Association 2014 for helpful comments. Cvijanović thanks the Rollie and Mary Windley Tillman Endowment Fund and the Wells Fargo Center for Corporate Finance at UNC Chapel Hill for financial support. Dasgupta and Zachariadis thank the Paul Woolley Centre and the Department of Finance at the LSE for financial support. Dasgupta thanks the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance and the Faculty of Economics at Cambridge University for their hospitality. We have read the Journal of Finance's disclosure policy and have no conflicts of interest to disclose.


ABSTRACT

We investigate whether business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds' proxy voting using a comprehensive data set spanning 2003 to 2011. In contrast to prior literature, we find that business ties significantly influence promanagement voting at the level of individual pairs of fund families and firms after controlling for Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations and holdings. The association is significant only for shareholder-sponsored proposals and stronger for those that pass or fail by relatively narrow margins. Our findings are consistent with a demand-driven model of biased voting in which company managers use existing business ties with funds to influence how they vote.

Ancillary