This paper is a substantially revised version of our working paper, ‘Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure’ (CEPR DP No. 7240 and IGIER WP No. 393). We are extremely grateful to Estelle Cantillon, Roman Inderst, Chiara Mosca, Marco Ottaviani, Fausto Panunzi, Martin Peitz, Patrick Rey and Giancarlo Spagnolo for their valuable suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at the 10th CEPR Conference on Applied Industrial Organization (Mannheim), Zurich University, EARIE 2008 (Toulouse), CIE Workshop 2007, CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions (IV edition), the Intertic Conference on Endogenous Market Structure (Milano Bicocca), CREST-INSEE (Paris), 2007 ASSET Meeting (Università di Padova), Erasmus University (Rotterdam), Tel Aviv University, Tilburg University, European University Institute (Florence), and Bocconi University (Milan). We are particularly grateful to the Editor and three anonymous referees for suggestions that helped us to improve the paper considerably. Chiara Fumagalli gratefully acknowledges financial support from MIUR (PRIN 2007). Massimo Motta gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN), through project ECO2010-15052.
Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure†
Version of Record online: 20 DEC 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Volume 60, Issue 4, pages 599–608, December 2012
How to Cite
Fumagalli, C., Motta, M. and Rønde, T. (2012), Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 60: 599–608. doi: 10.1111/joie.12006
- Issue online: 20 DEC 2012
- Version of Record online: 20 DEC 2012
- Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure. Grant Numbers: CEPR DP No. 7240, IGIER WP No. 393
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN). Grant Number: ECO2010-15052
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