The authors thank Rod R. Blagojevich for inspiring this work. We are grateful to Yasushi Asako, Stefano Barbieri, Arnab Biswas, John Duggan, Gilles Duranton, Antoine Loeper, Teemu Lyytikäinen, Debraj Ray, Nathan Seegert, Alastair Smith, Razvan Vlaicu, three anonymous referees and the JRS co-editor, Gianmarco Ottaviano, and seminar audiences at the Public Choice Society meetings in San Antonio, the Wallis Institute at the University of Rochester, and the Econometric Society Winter Meetings in San Diego for helpful comments. We are grateful to the University of Tokyo for financial support, but we retain responsibility for any errors.
LOCAL POLITICS AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND POLARIZATION†
Version of Record online: 4 APR 2014
© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Regional Science
Volume 54, Issue 5, pages 806–827, November 2014
How to Cite
Berliant, M. and Tabuchi, T. (2014), LOCAL POLITICS AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND POLARIZATION. Journal of Regional Science, 54: 806–827. doi: 10.1111/jors.12118
- Issue online: 3 NOV 2014
- Version of Record online: 4 APR 2014
- Manuscript Accepted: 24 FEB 2014
- Manuscript Revised: 24 DEC 2013
- Manuscript Received: 2 AUG 2013
We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a new economic geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons, whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts.