Strategy Proof Scoring Rule Lotteries for Multiple Winners
Article first published online: 21 JAN 2013
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 15, Issue 1, pages 103–123, February 2013
How to Cite
HECKELMAN, J. C. and CHEN, F. H. (2013), Strategy Proof Scoring Rule Lotteries for Multiple Winners. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 15: 103–123. doi: 10.1111/jpet.12011
- Issue published online: 21 JAN 2013
- Article first published online: 21 JAN 2013
- Received November 1, 2009; Accepted April 3, 2011.
We develop a lottery procedure for selecting multiple winners that is strategy proof. The rule assigns points to each candidate based on any standard scoring rule method, and then uses one draw to select a single winning set of candidates in proportion to their collective score. In addition to being strategy proof, the lottery rule is also shown to have several other attractive normative properties. Violations of some other important normative properties are noted as well.