Mike Felgenhauer, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 68131, Germany (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Informational and Monetary Lobbying: Expert Politicians, Good Decisions?
Version of Record online: 21 JAN 2013
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 15, Issue 1, pages 125–155, February 2013
How to Cite
FELGENHAUER, M. (2013), Informational and Monetary Lobbying: Expert Politicians, Good Decisions?. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 15: 125–155. doi: 10.1111/jpet.12012
I thank Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Matthias Dahm, Hans Peter Grüner, Elisabeth Schulte, Heiner Schumacher, Tri Vi Dang, Wioletta Dziuda, Simon Lörtscher, the seminar participants in Mannheim and at the NASM 2009 in Boston, an anonymous referee and an associate editor for useful comments and suggestions.
- Issue online: 21 JAN 2013
- Version of Record online: 21 JAN 2013
- Received January 20, 2010; Accepted March 23, 2011.
This paper finds that the strategic interaction between opposing interest groups depends on the decision maker's expertise. If the costs to provide information are sufficiently low, then the decision quality is nonmonotonic in the politician's expertise. An expert may attract less informational lobbying and make worse decisions than a politician who is ex ante endowed with less information and therefore less predisposed to a particular policy.