Mike Felgenhauer, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 68131, Germany (felgenha@rumms.uni-mannheim.de).
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Informational and Monetary Lobbying: Expert Politicians, Good Decisions?
Article first published online: 21 JAN 2013
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12012
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Additional Information
How to Cite
FELGENHAUER, M. (2013), Informational and Monetary Lobbying: Expert Politicians, Good Decisions?. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 15: 125–155. doi: 10.1111/jpet.12012
I thank Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Matthias Dahm, Hans Peter Grüner, Elisabeth Schulte, Heiner Schumacher, Tri Vi Dang, Wioletta Dziuda, Simon Lörtscher, the seminar participants in Mannheim and at the NASM 2009 in Boston, an anonymous referee and an associate editor for useful comments and suggestions.
Publication History
- Issue published online: 21 JAN 2013
- Article first published online: 21 JAN 2013
- Received January 20, 2010; Accepted March 23, 2011.
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