Market Games in Successive Oligopolies
Article first published online: 13 MAR 2013
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 397–410, June 2013
How to Cite
GABSZEWICZ, J., LAUSSEL, D., VAN YPERSELE, T. and ZANAJ, S. (2013), Market Games in Successive Oligopolies. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 15: 397–410. doi: 10.1111/jpet.12023
- Issue published online: 2 MAY 2013
- Article first published online: 13 MAR 2013
- Accepted manuscript online: 7 JAN 2013 04:35AM EST
- Manuscript Accepted: 12 MAY 2011
- Manuscript Received: 22 OCT 2010
This paper introduces a new approach to successive oligopolies. We draw on market games à la Shapley–Shubik to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets when the input price is determined by the action of all firms, downstream and upstream both. This approach differs from the classical one as it allows us to consider downstream firms that exercise market power both in both downstream and upstream markets. We perform a comparison of the market outcome with each scenarios as well as a welfare analysis.