This is a revised version of CORE Discussion Paper 2008-10. The authors are grateful to Alexandre Bailly for having drawn their attention to the data and cost sharing problem faced by the European chemical industry. Thanks are due to Theo Driessen, Pier Mario Pacini, Eve Ramaekers, Gisèle Umbhauer, Myrna Wooders, and two anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier versions. Financial support from the Belgian Interuniversity Pole of Attraction (PAI) program is gratefully acknowledged.
Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion
Version of Record online: 10 JUN 2013
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume 15, Issue 4, pages 654–673, August 2013
How to Cite
DEHEZ, P. and TELLONE, D. (2013), Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 15: 654–673. doi: 10.1111/jpet.12040
- Issue online: 10 JUN 2013
- Version of Record online: 10 JUN 2013
- Accepted manuscript online: 5 APR 2013 09:01AM EST
- Manuscript Accepted: 24 SEP 2011
- Manuscript Received: 1 FEB 2010
A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non-rival but excludable goods, i.e., public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the inputs they contribute. We show that this problem can be framed within a cost sharing game for which the Shapley value comes out as a natural solution. The main result concerns the regular structure of the core that enables a simple characterization of the nucleolus. However, compared to the Shapley value, the nucleolus defines compensations that appear to be less appropriate in the context of data sharing. Our analysis is inspired by the problem faced by the European chemical firms within the regulation program REACH that requires submission by 2018 of a detailed analysis of all the substances they produce, import, or use.