I am grateful to Robert Hahn, Mark Koyama, Peter Leeson, Paul Lewis, Chloé de Préneuf, seminar participants at Department of Political Economy, King's College London, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Hemal Shah, Naomi Fenwick, Chiara Riviera, and Zachary Caceres provided excellent research and editorial assistance. Support from the Legatum Institute, Institute of Humane Studies and the Mercatus Center is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are my own. Appendix with full results, and variable description, is available from author's website, http://www.daliborrohac.com/uploads/1/1/6/6/11663117/20130114_appendix_islamic_parties.pdf.
Religion as a Commitment Device: The Economics of Political Islam
Article first published online: 11 APR 2013
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Volume 66, Issue 2, pages 256–274, May 2013
How to Cite
Roháč, D. (2013), Religion as a Commitment Device: The Economics of Political Islam. Kyklos, 66: 256–274. doi: 10.1111/kykl.12020
- Issue published online: 11 APR 2013
- Article first published online: 11 APR 2013
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