We are grateful to two insightful and helpful referees, the managing editor Alois Stutzer, Theo Eicher, Mohammad Farzanegan, Rajeev Goel, Steve Gohmann, Dann Millimet, Salvatore Nunnari, John Pepper, Hem Paudel, Dan Phaneuf, Hilary Sigman, the participants at the World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Montreal, the MPSA Conference, Chicago, the NCDE Conference, Copenhagen, and at seminars at Clemson and Illinois State University, for constructive comments and suggestions. Dann Millimet kindly provided aspects of the data. Fredriksson gratefully acknowledges research and travel support from the College of Business, University of Louisville. Fredriksson worked on this paper while visiting Resources for the Future, and he is grateful for the hospitality. The usual disclaimers apply.
Political Institutions, Political Careers and Environmental Policy
Article first published online: 1 JAN 2014
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Volume 67, Issue 1, pages 54–73, February 2014
How to Cite
Fredriksson, P. G. and Wollscheid, J. R. (2014), Political Institutions, Political Careers and Environmental Policy. Kyklos, 67: 54–73. doi: 10.1111/kykl.12043
- Issue published online: 1 JAN 2014
- Article first published online: 1 JAN 2014
High party discipline and high party strength induce legislators to stay committed to the party's promised policies after their election. This is because party leaders are able to punish deviations and reward behavior that is in the party's interest. Higher political stability induces party leaders to take a longer-term perspective. We investigate the following interrelated hypotheses: (i) the effects of party discipline and party strength on environmental policy are conditional on the degree of political stability; and (ii) the effect of political stability is conditional on the levels of party discipline and party strength. Our empirical findings support these hypotheses.