I am extremely grateful to Richard A. Braun, Hideshi Itoh and Kazuya Kamiya for their invaluable advice and constructive comments during the early stages of this research. I thank two anonymous referees, Ricardo Alonso, Bruce Chapman, Harrison Cheng, Leslie Hannah, Andrew Macrae, John Matsusaka, Chris Orme, Hiroshi Osano and Pierre Picard for helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. I also acknowledge the comments of students in the ECON 604 Game Theory course offered at the University of Southern California along with participants in seminars at the University of Southern California, Tokyo University, Hitotsubashi University and Australian National University. This paper was supported by the Global Center of Excellence (COE) Program, ‘The Research and Training Center for New Development in Mathematics’.
Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs
Article first published online: 22 JAN 2014
© 2014 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Manchester School
How to Cite
Adachi-Sato, M. (2014), Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs. The Manchester School. doi: 10.1111/manc.12055
- Article first published online: 22 JAN 2014
- Manuscript Accepted: 12 DEC 2013
- Manuscript Received: 10 OCT 2011
- Global Center of Excellence (COE)
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