See Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, “Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization,” in The Anthropology of the State. A Reader, Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, eds. (Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Zachariah C. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers. Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Cornell University Press, 2011); “State and Non-State Regulation in African Protracted Crises: Governance without Government?,” Afrika Focus 21 (2009): 7–21; and Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces? Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (University Press, 2011)., and ,
Review Essay: Lebanon — The Challenge of Moving Analysis beyond the State
Article first published online: 26 MAR 2013
© 2013, The Authors Middle East Policy © 2013, Middle East Policy Council
Middle East Policy
Volume 20, Issue 1, pages 163–174, Spring 2013
How to Cite
(2013), Review Essay: Lebanon — The Challenge of Moving Analysis beyond the State. Middle East Policy, 20: 163–174. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12013
- Issue published online: 26 MAR 2013
- Article first published online: 26 MAR 2013
Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon , by . Cornell University Press , 2012 . 312 pages . $45.00 , hardcover .
The Lebanese Connection: Corruption, Civil War and the International Drug Traffic , by . Stanford University Press , 2012 . 272 pages . $35.00 , hardcover .
Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society , by . Routledge , 2012 . 176 pages . $44.95 , paperback .
Nora Stel, PhD candidate at Utrecht University's Centre for Conflict Studies and research fellow at the Maastricht School of Management
George Frerks, professor at Utrecht University and Wageningen University
In many countries, governance — the provision of security, welfare and representation — is not a prerogative of the state alone. Besides the usual NGOs, firms and lobbies, “non-state-governance actors” have the means and ambition to provide constituencies in specific areas with security (through regulating the internal use of force and offering protection from external threats), welfare (through social and utility services) and political representation (through institutions for feedback and consultation). Such non-state actors have intricate and often ambiguous relations with state institutions, resulting in complex and contested governance dynamics.
As a response to the academically unsatisfying fragile/failed-states paradigm, the social sciences developed several concepts to address non-state governance.1 For the purpose of this review, the most noteworthy among these are the “hybrid political order,”2 the “twilight institution”3 and the “mediated state.”4
In Lebanon, with its variety of sectarian organizations providing extensive governance beyond government,5 this enables fruitful cross-fertilization between empirical accounts and theoretical discussions of statehood and governance. However, this potential has been only marginally fulfilled in the most recent English-language monographs about the Lebanese state. Tom Najem's historical account is about Lebanese state formation but ignores theoretical debates on statehood and governance, instead using a rich collection of undefined concepts to deal with political orders and systems.6 Reinoud Leenders's political-science study deals with state-society relations but indirectly, via the analysis of corruption, which he sees as a proxy for such relations.7 Jonathan Marshall's political-economy analysis of Lebanon's drug business provides food for thought on the economic aspects of non-state governance, but ultimately focuses on the bankruptcy of state governance.
We do not aim to criticize books for not being something they never intended to be, and we are aware of the fact that non-state governance is not the central concern of the reviewed works. Our observations should therefore be seen as a contribution to the academic conversation on hybrid governance rather than as a criticism of the books as such.
Najem and Leenders themselves note the remarkable lack of academic analysis on the Lebanese state in the post-civil-war period. Leenders laments the “virtual absence of the state in the study of Lebanese politics,” even if there “are fierce political battles over the role of the state.”8 Aiming to address the “weaknesses and dynamics of the Lebanese state,” Najem too sets out to fill a “conspicuous gap in the existing academic literature on Lebanon.”9 Even Marshall, albeit to a lesser extent, aims to “shed light on the causes of […] state failure.”10 Indeed, while many renowned works discuss the Lebanese state, most are concerned with the formation of the Lebanese state and the 1975–90 civil war and its immediate aftermath,11 and few publications focus explicitly on the Lebanese state in the post-war period.12 Overall, as Leenders recapitulates, the account of the Lebanese state is mostly either normative — as apparent in the discourse on Lebanon's “weak state” and its opposite, a (strong) “state of institutions”13— or depoliticized and technical – as in World Bank-inspired managerial, legalistic and administrative approaches to state reform.14
We argue that such conceptual lack of interest in the state obscures the analysis of governance beyond it. By not defining the state more deeply, one assumes it encompasses all governance, which neither does justice to Lebanese reality nor provides a solid basis for engagement with Lebanese governance actors.
The Fragile State as a Default Mode
- Top of page
- The Fragile State as a Default Mode
- The Elusiveness of Politics and Governance beyond the State
Through a meticulous investigation of corruption in several public institutions, Leenders dissects the (dys)function of the Lebanese state. Inspired by New Institutional Economics, he shows how Lebanese politicians systematically design, divert and circumvent policies in ways that fill their own pockets, serve their own interests and undermine state capacity and legitimacy.
Leenders's main explanation for such systemic “high” corruption is these state institutions’ deviations from the “essential criteria associated with bureaucratic organization derived from its Weberian ideal type.”15 This ideal-type state is governed by procedures and regulations with external checks and controls and a strict separation of public office from private interest. Through scrupulous empirical analysis, Leenders demonstrates how ambiguous mandates and ill-defined procedures, often characterized by “permanent temporariness and exceptionality,” facilitate endemic corruption by paralyzing state watchdogs and interlocking the public and private sectors.
For Leenders, this failure to meet basic bureaucratic criteria is inherent in Lebanon's post-war political settlement. He identifies five aspects thereof that undermine Weberian standards: quasi-permanent deadlock stemming from high levels of inclusiveness and extreme dispersal of power; institutional elitism and a politics of apportionment; continual circumvention of the stalemates of the formal political arrangement; weak popular support for elites and concurrent further confessionalization of politics; and Syrian manipulation.16
Leenders studies corruption not as a practice in itself but as a “window into the nature of Lebanon's post-war state.”17 While adopting corruption as a way to explore “what constituted the Lebanese state and where its boundaries with society were to be drawn,” however, Leenders seems to partly fall into the same trap as those he criticizes for ignoring the state. He does not conceptualize “the state,” which remains an ever-present, yet ephemeral, notion throughout the book.18
In our reading of Leenders, the state seems to be a collection of public institutions, part of an overarching bureaucracy that is conceptualized in opposition to the private sector.19 It is not clear what the theoretical relations between the “state” and the “bureaucracy” are or how the “state” and the “political system” relate to each other conceptually. The state is deployed as an aggregated actor with agency — apparent in phrases like “the state could not take responsibility”; “the deal between the state and Solidere”; and “the state was now seriously addressing importers’ malpractices.”20 At the same time, the state is never actually identified as more than the sum of its parts (the state institutions Leenders is primarily interested in).
This lack of conceptual clarity is remarkable in light of Leenders's astute analysis of the importance of the “idea” of the state.21 He argues that “the failure of bureaucratic institution-building” in Lebanon far from implies that the state is insignificant for analyses of Lebanese politico-institutional development. Paradoxically, because of the porous boundaries between public and private institutions, the state might well be “all-important” in determining access to resources and opportunities: “without the notion of bureaucratic organization, there would have been no proceeds from manipulating it.”22 Leenders persuasively shows how politicians need and use the administrative capacity and authoritative back-up of the very institutions they undermine to pursue their interests.23
Yet Leenders's framework also suggests an apparent exceptionalism of corruption. The overlap between public and private is not merely seen as undesirable, it is also seen as deviating from a specific standard. However, this Weberian ideal does not reflect the majority of prevailing state organizations and is hardly a historical standard in Lebanon. Leenders acknowledges this, and he is right in arguing that the ideal nature of the criteria does not prevent them from shedding light on the causes of corruption in Lebanon. But the omission of alternative views on the state, state-society relations, public authority and bureaucracy that are less traditionally Western and state-centered, is striking. Leenders sees institutional disarray as deliberately generated and pursued by politicians seeking to benefit from this.24 As such, he is well aware of the intentional nature of the dysfunctional state apparatus. Yet his insistence on seeing corruption as the dysfunction or failure of one system (the Weberian bureaucracy) obscures how corruption is also the function or success of another system. It is that other system that needs explication. In an empirical sense, Leenders provides this, but theoretical underpinning is largely absent.
Marshall is predominantly interested in dissecting the origins, workings and consequences of Lebanon's drug economy. He is convinced that “the hidden history of Lebanon's drug trade fills an important gap in the traditional story of its recent political and socioeconomic development.”25 He offers a nuanced account of the ways in which Lebanon's drug economy affects its political economy and vice versa and how this process both lengthened and dampened the civil war.26
While the core topic of Marshall's book is not related to state or non-state governance, Marshall does seek to “better understand the complex impact of vast drug wealth on political realignments and civil-state relations.”27 The “state” features throughout the book and reveals itself, in the concluding chapter, tellingly titled “From Narco-state to Failed State,” as one of its main explanatory notions. Whether Marshall seeks to explore how Lebanon's state institutions have facilitated its drug business, or whether he is more interested in how drugs “are critical to understanding the dynamics of the modern state,” remains obscured by the truism that “the ballooning drug trade was both a cause and a consequence of state failure in Lebanon.”28
Nevertheless, Marshall clearly sees Lebanon not merely as a state whose citizens are involved in drugs, but as a “narco-state.” He quotes experts who claim that “the Lebanese government is in the narcotic business.”29 Indeed, it is the “narco” or “shadow”30 character of the state that allowed the rise of “quasi-states”31 and ensured Lebanon's eventual degeneration into a “failed state.” Marshall even uses the term “ravaged state,” stressing the importance of foreign intervention to both Lebanon's drug economy and its state failure.32 Ultimately, however, Marshall seems unable to substantiate the exact relations between these variations on state fragility because he hardly defines them.
He paints a picture of a vicious triangle from Lebanon's political system to its corruption to its drug economy.33 Time and again he links the marginalization,34 fragmentation35 and breakdown of the legitimacy and authority36 of the state and central government37 to the flourishing of Lebanon's drug economy. While it may ultimately be the relationship between drugs and war that proves Marshall's main interest,38 he suggests it is the disintegration of state institutions that provides the link.39 The drug economy, Marshall argues, “helped create temporary substitutes for the state.”40 Indeed, in his celebration of General Aoun's 1989 attack on “racketeering enterprises and illegal drug ports” as “the rehabilitation — or reinvention — of Lebanon's state,” Marshall seems to causally link “state weakness” with “drug strength.”41
Yet, despite Marshall's proclaimed interest in the nature and operation of the Lebanese state and its relations with the drug business, there is no definition, theory or analytical strategy to be found in his book to approach the state either as a concept or as an institution. This ultimately makes Marshall's conclusions on relations between the rise and fall of Lebanon's drug economy and the waning and waxing of state strength rather intuitive.
Najem's book is devoted to the study of the causes, consequences and interrelationships of three “systemic weaknesses” of Lebanon's political system: sectarian tensions, external penetration and state weakness. Through a historical analysis of Lebanese state formation, Najem delivers a solid overview of Lebanese politico-institutional development. However, he fails to conceptualize, theorize or define what it is he talks about when discussing “a” or “the” state; though it is the main topic of his book. Nowhere does he elaborate on core concepts such as “society,”“state,”“government,”“state institutions,”“authorities,”“civil service,”“the political system” or “political order,” terms seemingly used interchangeably.
The state is seen as structure and actor at the same time, and it remains unclear what or who constitutes the state. This confusion is palpable when Najem notes, for instance, that “the zuama also worked together within the state context to prevent the Lebanese state itself from becoming too strong and therefore capable of impinging on their own regional power bases.”42 Najem describes a power struggle between “the state” ruled by specific elites and the “zuama,” traditional notables and political bosses, in essence constituting the same elites.43 While the paradoxical simultaneity of these elites as both state representatives and state opponents does not do injustice to the “reality” of Lebanese politics,44 such observations, lacking an analytical framework, confound rather than elucidate.
This also affects the comprehension of the causal relations between Najem's three systemic weaknesses. The former two (sectarian tensions and foreign penetrations) appear to describe the latter (state weakness): state weakness is sectarian tensions and foreign penetration and vice versa. Occasional reference is made to notions such as functionality, distributional capacity and legitimacy, but these too are not defined.45 In light of the overarching emphasis on the importance of the state's capacity to resist foreign penetration and internal elite encroachment, it seems to be the traditional Weberian notion of state sovereignty that is the single most important characteristic of the ideal strong state, as opposed to the described weak Lebanese state.
At the same time, Najem takes “consociationalism” as the political system against which he evaluates the Lebanese state.46 The proper functioning of consociational democracies is dependent on four prerequisites: clear communal boundaries, elite coordination, balance of power and a relatively low “total load on the system.” In essence, Najem equates the state with the political system, resulting in a circular logic. He implies that a strong state is a sovereign state (free from sectarian-elite encroachment and foreign penetration), and that such state strength can, in Lebanon, be achieved through consociational democracy. This consociational democracy, however, will only function (that is, result in state strength) if it fulfills the four stated prerequisites, which it does not because the state is weak. Thus, the state is weak because the political system does not function, and the political system does not function because the state is weak. The consociational democracy notion here reinstates itself as a prescriptive policy proposition and reveals its limitations in serving as an explanatory framework.47
Najem creates welcome linkages between pre-war, war and post-war Lebanese politics, proposing an analytical continuity often absent from the bulk of literature on Lebanon that focuses on specific historical periods.48 The lack of conceptualization of state, society and political system does not undermine the book's value in this regard. But Najem's taking for granted of the state manifests a broader phenomenon, noted in different guises by Leenders and Marshall: analyzing the Lebanese state according to Weberian benchmarks, and thereby slipping into the fragile-state paradigm. With his coining of the term “penetrated state,” for instance, Najem seems to be adding yet another (dis)qualifying prefix to the word “state:” semi, quasi, failed, weak and fragile.49 Like other manifestations of the fragile-state paradigm, Najem's approach hides specific elements of Lebanese political life from view. Not critically engaging with the academic concept of the state precludes an engagement with any particular empirical manifestation of “statehood.”
The Elusiveness of Politics and Governance beyond the State
- Top of page
- The Fragile State as a Default Mode
- The Elusiveness of Politics and Governance beyond the State
The simultaneous centrality and indistinctness of the Lebanese state in the reviewed books partly stems from a narrow approach to the state as being concerned with overall organization and regulation. What is actually organized and regulated seems of only secondary interest. This obscures the role of non-state actors in such organization, regulation and provision. Approaching Lebanon as a more hybrid governance arena connects the state with other societal actors.50 An exclusive focus on one actor — the state — without taking into account the activity — governance — with which it is concerned, limits one's view of how other actors constitute and shape the state. In the reviewed works this is predominantly a matter of conceptualization, as all authors duly recognize the empirical significance of non-state governance actors — even if they do not theorize this significance.
Leenders recognizes the fluidity of statehood, for instance, in noting that “many could speak in its [the Ministry of Transport's] name, but no one was held ultimately responsible for what happened there.”51 Yet he does not seem to follow up on the implications of such fluidity beyond what it means for bureaucratic organization. His assertion that the ideal distinction between public (office) and private (interest) is not satisfyingly implemented in Lebanon suffices for an analysis of corruption. However, regarding Leenders's self-proclaimed ambition to talk about the state, a further conceptualization of the non-state/non-public is called for. This, we suggest, requires connecting the problematic “non-state” in the corruption assessment — the politicians-cum-businessmen who undermine state bureaucratic organization by furthering private interests with public means — with the other “non-state” actors so prevalent in Lebanon: the religious authorities, sectarian leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil-society organizations (CSOs) and lobbies.
Several components in Leenders's book would lend themselves especially well to this exercise. His pungent analysis of Solidere presents the real-estate initiative reconstructing downtown Beirut as neither a completely public nor an entirely private entity. “Only by balancing on the threshold between the public and the private sectors could Hariri and his associates apply the power of the state to enforce the scheme while simultaneously keeping a safe distance from the political settlement.”52 Thus, the notion of the state as a public institution was indispensable for Solidere to accomplish its principally private aims. These aims were pursued through an institutional design that “defied a clear distinction between the state and the private sector.”53
Yet Leenders's Weberian reference frame ultimately dictates the overlap between state and society as a political problem, rather than a social given. As a result, there is little appreciation for the ways in which non-state institutions pick up where state institutions fail. Who, if not the state, provides health care to the Lebanese? Who takes care of the displaced? Who manages the Beirut harbor? Analyzing why the state cannot do its job would be (even) more worthwhile when coupled with an enquiry of who, then, is doing this job the state fails to do.
Marshall's detailed study of the Lebanese drug economy shows the significance of non-state governance in a different way. Marshall recognizes that “drug rents are best extracted by either corrupt states or quasi-state organizations with de facto control over wide areas” and notes that “illicit profits enriched traditional elites and strengthened their patronage power at the expense of modern state institutions.”54 He shows how drugs provided the “country's resource-hungry militia with the means to afford huge purchases of foreign arms and fat payrolls, as well as to maintain civil order and administer basic services within their ministates,”55 and how clans from the various Lebanese sectarian communities traditionally making up Lebanon's political class and delivering its statesmen overlapped neatly with the cartels running drug production and trade.56 While not explicated, Marshall's elaborate discussions of the various international “connections”— mostly through the Palestinian camps and French, Syrian and Israeli occupation forces — constitute another form of non-state (transnational) governance.
Despite his lack of theorization, Marshall uses a distinct discourse in seeking to understand the governance of the drug economy. Where Leenders and Najem have a predominantly institutional approach, focusing on organizations and structures, Marshall deals with networks and persons and relationships.57 This choice is no doubt pragmatic, but it also highlights the pertinence of the informal in (social, economic or political) governance and provides a potential link to more hybrid theories of statehood and governance. The network perspective resonates with the idea of mediated governance, as mutually shared interests of the drug trade often result in “fruitful collaboration among people of diverse, feuding religions.”58 On the other hand, the personalized nature of the drug economy raises a question: to what extent a separation can be made between individuals and organizations? Marshall recognizes this matter with regard to the PLO's role in the drug economy, wondering whether Palestinians were “operating as criminals on their own behalf or as representatives of their organization.”59 This issue, however, concerns all actors involved in the Lebanese “drug melting pot,” a reality Marshall fails to satisfactorily address.60
Najem, too, makes ample reference to non-state actors in the form of zuama and the political parties built around them.61 He mentions that “the sectarian zuama continued to be effectively autonomous actors and to wield most of the real power in Lebanese society,” but subsequently seems content to focus on the non-power of the state rather than substantiating the power of the non-state.62 In fact, he acknowledges that, while “the sectarian elites still exercised massive influence in Lebanese political life,…much of this was informal and difficult to explore in detail.”63 Difficult as it may be, as Leenders and Marshall show, this informal political influence seems the crux of a significant analysis of politics, the state and governance in Lebanon.
Apart from the zuama, Najem addresses another category of non-state actors, which he calls “extra-institutional elements.” He rightfully states that “no account of the 1990–2005 postwar Lebanese system would be complete without considering the important role that certain elements operating outside of the formal institutional context played in the political life of the society.”64 He refers to religious and sociocultural leaders, most notably the Maronite patriarch, Shiite religious authorities and diaspora communities. In addition, there is some fleeting attention to “quasi-state organizations” such as the Council of the South.65 His treatment of “extra-institutional elements,” however, suffers from many of the same limitations discussed for the zuama.
Najem describes his third category of non-state actors as states-within-the-state (with reference to the PLO, the Christian war-time militias and “Hezbollah-controlled parts of Lebanon”) that constitute a major manifestation of and cause for “state weakness.”66 Unfortunately, he abstains from devoting attention to the development and functioning of these entities in a way that could shed light on their connections to and overlap with state governance. While Najem mentions the rise of wartime militia leaders as new elites who in some communities replaced or sidelined traditional zuama, little attention is devoted to the on-the-ground governance activities that underlie much of their influence in the post-war political system.67
Several concepts have been developed in the social sciences to grasp the phenomenon of non-state governance. Most notable here are the “hybrid political order” as a macro-level counter-paradigm for the fragile-state model in non-Western settings and the “twilight institution” and “mediated state” that offer a more applied perspective. Volker Boege et al. were among the first to not only criticize the failed-state paradigm but also suggest an alternative frame of reference: the hybrid political order.68 They argue that while institutions and governance might be necessary for peace, security and development, these need not be state institutions and governance. The word hybrid is meant to reveal a “situation of co-existence, overlap, and blending” to counter views of clearly distinguishable state or non-state (or public versus private or civil) institutions and organizations.69 This highlights the state as one of several reference points for governance. It is a clear opposition to the normative dominance the state is awarded in Weberian assessments. Marshall's case study of the governance of the Lebanese drug economy provides a striking but unrecognized case in point.
Kraushaar and Lambach herald the hybrid concept as adding value because of its non-state-centrism, its agnosticism about the effectiveness of governance, its rejection of essentialism and teleology, and its comprehensiveness.70 Najem's book, with its interest in both state and society, would be served by this broader and more critical perspective of governance arenas. Leenders's account of corruption perhaps does not directly demand it, but his interest in public-private overlaps could do with more theoretical nuance.
Lund coined the term “twilight institution” to connote the exercising of public authority in the conceptual and practical space between state and non-state. He approaches the state as consisting of idea and institution. His attention to the “idea” of the state explicates a central paradox in the study of the state in many non-Western settings: the omnipotence of the idea of the state versus the weakness of its institutions. The concept of twilight institutions renders visible the fact that even the non- or anti-state presents itself with reference to the state. The idea of a powerful state with an intention and a higher rationality is a construct both the institutional state (represented by the government) and twilight institutions depend upon to legitimize their governance.71
Leenders breaks down the fiction of a unitary and rational state particularly well. His analysis of institutionalized corruption provides rare empirical evidence of exactly how a multifaceted and internally riven state apparatus can emerge and endure. His specific descriptions are often perfect illustrations of twilight institutions. Yet Leenders apparently lacks an interest in conceptually following up on this. Najem skillfully uncovers tensions between official and unofficial institutions in Lebanese politics and draws out the resultant problems.72 However, he does not go beyond a normative approach to the formal-informal dichotomy, simply suggesting that further formalization would have made the Lebanese state stronger.73 His references to tensions between “the actual political process” and the prescribed process are manifold, but his state-centered approach does not allow him to explore the informal side of the coin beyond its contribution to state weakness.74
Where the twilight institution emphasizes how many institutions are neither state nor non-state, the mediated-state thesis maintains a basic state/non-state distinction but highlights mutual dependence. Menkhaus is primarily interested in the interactions between governance actors based on partnership (rather than competition or contracting), wherein state institutions enact their authority through non-state organizations, be they traditional or modern.75 This does not assume an ideological predilection of the state, and mediation should not be equated with outsourcing in a neoliberal privatization sense. Rather, it emerges from an “if you can't beat them, join them” logic.76 The mediated-state notion would shed light on the relations among sectarian leaders (taking center stage in Najem's analysis), state representatives (central in Leenders) and businessmen (Marshall's focus) in Lebanon. It could help analyze the concurrent cooptation and contestation among “elites” and “the state” that remains unsolved in the reviewed works.
In short, the above concepts are useful to a further analysis of Lebanese statehood and governance in three main ways. First, they help to conceptually break down the dichotomies of public and private, state and society, formal and informal and traditional and modern. Second, they move analysis away from the somewhat ahistorical and decontextualized Weberian perspective. Third, they permit scholars to systematically adopt a more comprehensive perspective by focusing on many different governance actors, rather than limiting themselves to just one (the “state”).
- Top of page
- The Fragile State as a Default Mode
- The Elusiveness of Politics and Governance beyond the State
Leenders provides an unprecedentedly consistent and lucid analysis, not only of the “how” of Lebanese corruption, but also of its “why.” High corruption is in many ways the hub of Lebanese politico-institutional life, and Leenders is perhaps the first to actually engage with the elephant in the room of Lebanese political analysis. Najem's work, more modest in ambition, offers an accessible overview of Lebanese state formation, a welcome addition to the more specified recent works. Marshall offers a uniquely applied insight into the economic aspects of governance relations, stressing the significance of the sidelining of state institutions by informal networks.
On another level, however, these books are further additions to the already extensive literature about what is not working in Lebanon. What seems the really pertinent question is how Lebanese society is governed — by state and non-state institutions — beyond the (failing) façade of the national sovereign. A state-centered, fragility-oriented paradigm inherently cannot offer the perspective needed to address this. In light of the conceptual developments in the field of governance in hybrid political orders, the conclusion of state weakness need no longer be the end of the story. Instead, it can be the beginning of an analysis that addresses what (state and non-state) governance does take place in situations of state “weakness.”
A cross-fertilization between observations and theories of state-society interaction would not only enhance our understanding of Lebanese politics; it might substantially contribute to the development of the concepts of hybrid political order, twilight institutions and mediated statehood. Considering that these concepts currently draw heavily on African cases, comparative empirical insights from the Middle East could be particularly valuable. In fact, Christian Lund extends an open invitation “to confront our findings with empirical analyses of other contexts.”77 We would reiterate this invitation to scholars working on Lebanon.
“State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order,” Political Science 59 (2007): 45–56; and , and , “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States,” Peace Review 21 (2009): 13–21., , , and ,
“Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa,” Development and Change 37 (2009): 685–705.,
“Governance without Government in Somalia. Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31 (2007): 74–106. See also and , “Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa,” Development and Change 41 (2010): 539–562.,
See Rami G. Khouri, “Lebanon's Parallel Governance,” in Democratic Deficits: Addressing Challenges to Sustainability and Consolidation around the World, Gary Bland and Cynthia J. Arnson, eds. (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009), 195–203; Anne-Marie Baylouny, “Authority Outside the State: Non-State Actors and New Institutions in the Middle East,” in Ungoverned Spaces? Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds. (Stanford University Press, 2011), 101–113; “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon,” World Politics 62 (2010): 381–421; George Corm, “Le centre ville de Beyrouth — Ou est l'état?,”Les Cahiers de l'Orient 24 (1991): 97–110; Judith Harik, The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias (Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994); and Khalil Gebara and Gaelle Kibranian, “Corruption, State-Building and Communal Strife. The Role of Non-State Actors in Lebanon” (paper presented in the workshop on “Corruption and Reform Initiatives in the Security Sector in the MENA Region,” Athens, November 2, 2008).and ,
Tom Najem, Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society (Routledge, 2012).
Reinoud Leenders, Spoils of Truce. Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon (Cornell University Press, 2012), 1.
Tom Najem, Lebanon: the Politics of a Penetrated Society, i.
Jonathan V. Marshall, The Lebanese Connection. Corruption, Civil War, and the International Drug Traffic (Cornell University Press, 2012), 12.
See Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation. The Abduction of Lebanon (Oxford University Press, 1990); Nurit Kliot, The Territorial Disintegration of a State: The Case of Lebanon (University of Durham, 1986); Abbas Kelidar, Lebanon: The Collapse of a State: Regional Dimensions of the Struggle (Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976); Albert Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon: A Historical Introduction (Center for Lebanese Studies, 1986); Tabitha Petran, The Struggle for Lebanon (Monthly Review Press, 1987); Theodor Hanf and Nawaf Salam, eds., Lebanon in Limbo. Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment (Nomos Verlagengesellschaft, 2003); Oren Barak, “Lebanon: Failure, Collapse, and Resuscitation,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 305–340; “A Lasting Failure: Fixed Borders and State Weakness in Lebanon” (paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 26–29, 2008); Adham Saouli, “Stability under Late State Formation: The Case of Lebanon,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19 (2006): 701–717; Rania Maktabi, “State Formation and Citizenship in Lebanon: The Politics of Membership and Exclusion in a Sectarian State,” in Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis and Manuel Hassassian, eds. (Syracuse University Press, 2000), 147–179; and Farid El Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967–1976 (I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000).,
With the exception perhaps of Ali Fayyad, Fragile States: Dilemmas of Stability in Lebanon and the Arab World (International NGO Training and Research Centre, 2008); and Theodor Hanf and Nawaf Salam, eds., Lebanon in Limbo. Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment; “Searching for the ‘Ideal Face of the State’ in a Lebanese Border Town,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16 (2010): 330–346.,
See “Hariri's Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant?,” Middle East Policy 6 (1998): 158–173.and ,
Reinoud Leenders, Spoils of Truce. Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon, 235–237.
Ibid., 107, 114, 184.
Ibid., 116, 129, 121, 143, 207.
Jonathan V. Marshall, The Lebanese Connection. Corruption, Civil War, and the International Drug Traffic, 164.
Ibid., 163, 169.
Ibid., 2, 78.
Ibid., 103, 107.
Ibid., 165, 15.
Ibid., 166, 89.
As suggested on page 165.
Tom Najem, Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society, 21, authors’ emphasis.
Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg, “Hariri's Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant?”
Ibid., 15, 26, 55.
“Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21 (1969): 207–225.,
See Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford University Press, 2008); Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (The Brookings Institution, 2008); Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mina Baliamoune-Lutz and Marc McGillivray, “State Fragility: Concept and Measurement” (UNU-WIDER Research Paper 44, 2008); and Claire McIouglin, “Topic Guide on Fragile States” (Governance and Social Development Research Center: University of Birmingham, 2010).
See Jan Kooiman, Governing as Governance (Sage Publications, 2003); “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government,” British Journal of Sociology 43 (1992): 173–205; and , “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions,” International Social Science Journal 50 (1998): 17–28.and ,
Reinoud Leenders, Spoils of Truce. Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon, 93.
Jonathan V. Marshall, The Lebanese Connection. Corruption, Civil War, and the International Drug Traffic, 169.
This is especially evident in Marshall's analysis of the involvement of the Lebanese banking sector in the drug economy (pages 51–52).
Ibid., 142. He raises the same concerns with regard to Hezbollah (page 150), but not considering the zuama he also discusses.
Ibid., 133, 162.
Tom Najem, Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society, 16–17.
Ibid., 27, 37, 75.
Volker Boege, Anne Brown and Kevin P. Clements, “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States.”
Kevin P. Clements, Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Wendy Foley and Anna Nolan, “State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order,” 46.
Maren Kraushaar and Daniel Lambach, “Hybrid Political Orders: The Added Value of a New Concept” (Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies Occasional Papers Series, 2009), 4.
“Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa,” 689; and James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality,” American Ethnologist 29 (2000): 981.,
Tom Najem, Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society, 13, 60.
Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia. Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping.”
Christian Lund, “Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa,” 682.