I am grateful to two anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments, and to Steve Clarke for useful suggestions. I have also benefited from discussion with Joshua Greene. Parts of this article were presented at a symposium at the American Philosophical Association Meeting at Boston, and at the School of Psychology at the University of Birmingham. Work on this article was supported by a University Award from the Wellcome Trust (WT087208MF).
On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 27, Issue 5, pages 519–545, November 2012
How to Cite
Kahane, G. (2012), On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind & Language, 27: 519–545. doi: 10.1111/mila.12001
Re-use of this article is permitted in accordance with the Terms and Conditions set out at http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/onlineopen#OnlineOpen_Terms
- Issue published online: 29 OCT 2012
- Article first published online: 29 OCT 2012
According to Joshua Greene's influential dual process model of moral judgment, different modes of processing are associated with distinct moral outputs: automatic processing with deontological judgment, and controlled processing with utilitarian judgment. This article aims to clarify and assess Greene's model. I argue that the proposed tie between process and content is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence, and that the supposed evidence for controlled processing in utilitarian judgment is actually likely to reflect, not ‘utilitarian reasoning’, but a form of moral deliberation which, ironically, is actually in serious tension with a utilitarian outlook. This alternative account is further supported by the results of a neuroimaging study showing that intuitive and counterintuitive judgments have similar neural correlates whether or not their content is utilitarian or deontological.