I am grateful to two anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments, and to Steve Clarke for useful suggestions. I have also benefited from discussion with Joshua Greene. Parts of this article were presented at a symposium at the American Philosophical Association Meeting at Boston, and at the School of Psychology at the University of Birmingham. Work on this article was supported by a University Award from the Wellcome Trust (WT087208MF).
On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 27, Issue 5, pages 519–545, November 2012
How to Cite
Kahane, G. (2012), On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind & Language, 27: 519–545. doi: 10.1111/mila.12001
Re-use of this article is permitted in accordance with the Terms and Conditions set out at http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/onlineopen#OnlineOpen_Terms
- Issue published online: 29 OCT 2012
- Article first published online: 29 OCT 2012
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