In combining a pluri-propositionalist framework (Bach-style) concerning alleged conventional implicatures, and a pluri-propositionalist framework (Perry-style) distinguishing various levels of content associated with a single utterance, I defend a Grice-inspired model of communication. In so doing, I rely on the distinction between what is said, i.e. what is semantically encoded, and what is pragmatically implicated. I show how the notion of same-saying plays a central role in dealing with problems pertaining to communication insofar as it permits us to posit a stability of content among interlocutors. I also show how people can be classified as same-sayers in different ways, viz. if they express the same (minimal) proposition/content or if they utter the same sentence. If A utters ‘I'm happy’ and B replies: ‘C said that too’, what B said can mean either that C said that A is happy—thus C and A expressed the same proposition—or that C utters the same words—they both utter ‘I'm happy’ and in so doing express different propositions, i.e. that A is happy and that C is happy respectively.