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Delusions Redux


  • My great thanks and appreciation go to the authors of the preceding essays, who have each taught me as much about my own ideas as theirs. For help in understanding two-factor theorizing about delusions I also thank Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, John Sutton and their colleagues at Macquarie University's Centre for Cognitive Science where I was a Visiting Scholar during February-March 2012.

Address for correspondence: Philosophy Department, University of Massachusetts Boston, Massachusetts 02125. USA.



My response to the preceding essays begins with some preliminaries about my terminology, approach, and conception of rationality as a regulative ideal. I then comment on the Murphy's discussion about normal religious belief and religious delusions, and on causal assumptions challenged by Langdon's folies à deux. Responding to Gerrans's imagination-based account of delusion and Hohwy's discussion of illusions, I next try to envision what both doxastic and imagination-based approaches might have overlooked by asking whether there can be delusional feelings. Final comments address the place of phenomenology within Coltheart's two-factor theorizing.