Many thanks to Louise Antony, Abe Roth, Shannon Spaulding, Declan Smithies, and William Taschek, all of whom commented on earlier incarnations of this paper. Thanks are also due to audiences at the 2012 Central APA, Lingnan University and the 2012 meeting of The Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture
Version of Record online: 2 APR 2014
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 29, Issue 2, pages 201–237, April 2014
How to Cite
FULLER, T. and SAMUELS, R. (2014), Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture. Mind & Language, 29: 201–237. doi: 10.1111/mila.12047
- Issue online: 2 APR 2014
- Version of Record online: 2 APR 2014
Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims about the holistic nature of scientific inference. Having done so, we outline more promising relations that hold between theories of scientific inference and ordinary cognition.