Thanks to Mahrad Almotahari, Corine Besson, Patrycja Kaszynska, and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
SYMPOSIUM ON READING IN THE BRAIN BY STANISLAS DEHAENE
Speech Acts: Natural or Normative Kinds? The Case of Assertion
Article first published online: 4 JUN 2014
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 29, Issue 3, pages 336–350, June 2014
How to Cite
BALL, B. (2014), Speech Acts: Natural or Normative Kinds? The Case of Assertion. Mind & Language, 29: 336–350. doi: 10.1111/mila.12054
- Issue published online: 4 JUN 2014
- Article first published online: 4 JUN 2014
There are two views of the essences of speech acts: according to one view, they are natural kinds; according to the other, they are what I call normative kinds—kinds in the (possibly non-reductive) definition of which some normative term occurs. In this article I show that speech acts can be normative but also natural kinds by deriving Williamson's account of assertion, on which it is an act individuated, and constitutively governed, by a norm (the knowledge rule), from a consideration of the natural characteristics of normal cases of its performance.