Does The Necessity of Mathematical Truths Imply Their Apriority?
Article first published online: 30 MAY 2013
© 2013 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd & University of Southern California
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 94, Issue 4, pages 431–445, December 2013
How to Cite
McEvoy, M. (2013), Does The Necessity of Mathematical Truths Imply Their Apriority?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94: 431–445. doi: 10.1111/papq.12007
- Issue published online: 4 NOV 2013
- Article first published online: 30 MAY 2013
It is sometimes argued that mathematical knowledge must be a priori, since mathematical truths are necessary, and experience tells us only what is true, not what must be true. This argument can be undermined either by showing that experience can yield knowledge of the necessity of some truths, or by arguing that mathematical theorems are contingent. Recent work by Albert Casullo and Timothy Williamson argues (or can be used to argue) the first of these lines; W. V. Quine and Hartry Field take the latter line. I defend a version of the argument against these, and other objections.