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Whither Integrity II: Integrity and Impartial Morality
Article first published online: 17 JAN 2013
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12006
© 2013 The Author. Philosophy Compass © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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How to Cite
Scherkoske, G. (2013), Whither Integrity II: Integrity and Impartial Morality. Philosophy Compass, 8: 40–52. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12006
Publication History
- Issue published online: 17 JAN 2013
- Article first published online: 17 JAN 2013
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Abstract
The idea that impartial moral theories – consequentialism and Kantian ethics in particular – were objectionably hostile to a person’s integrity was famously championed by Bernard Williams nearly 40 years ago. That Williams’‘integrity objection’ has significantly shaped subsequent moral theorizing is widely acknowledged. It is less widely appreciated how this objection has helped shape recent thinking about the nature and value of integrity itself. This paper offers a critical survey of main lines of response to this objection.