Version of Record online: 27 MAR 2013
© 2013 The Author. Philosophy Compass © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Volume 8, Issue 5, pages 486–495, May 2013
How to Cite
Schwarz, W. (2013), Contingent Identity. Philosophy Compass, 8: 486–495. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12028
- Issue online: 27 MAR 2013
- Version of Record online: 27 MAR 2013
It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical) to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b. This view is supported an argument from Leibniz's Law and a popular conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is wrong with the argument from Leibniz's Law.